This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

 


Leveraging Indictors of Compromise (IOC) and searching historical data for attack patterns is one of the primary responsibilities of a security monitoring team. Relevant security data for threat hunting/investigation related to an enterprise is produced in multiple locations – cloud, on-premises, and being able to analyze all the data from a single point makes it easier to spot trends and attack. Azure Sentinel has made it super easy to collect data from multiple logs across different environments and run KQL queries of recently released threat indicators across this entire data set. For example, through its recently released Microsoft 365 Defender connector security teams can now easily ingest Microsoft 365 data into Azure Sentinel allowing correlation of M365 raw logs with Sentinel’s additional data sources to provide additional insights for investigations, hunting and alerts. In this blog post we share some of the IOC’s related to one such threat actor that Microsoft tracks as Barium and the sample Azure Sentinel queries related to it that leverage multiple logs including those coming from Microsoft 365 Defender connector .


 


About a month and a half ago, the US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, released documents detailing work done by a range of public and private sector organizations, including Microsoft, to disrupt Barium’s cyberattack infrastructure. Barium is intent on compromising research and development (R&D) heavy organizations in telecom, high tech, computer, and healthcare; their financially motivated operations have focused primarily on the video game industry. The techniques that the group have used in the past have varied from using malicious .lnk files, Word and PowerPoint macros, to the use of open-source tools like Cobalt strike to achieve their objective. The group has been pretty prolific in the use of “supply chain” attacks to compromise software providers and then modify the providers’ code to facilitate further intrusions against its customers. They have also been seen using C2 “dead drops,” which are seemingly legitimate web pages that have encoded instructions to their malware.  In their campaign they have also been seen using typo-squatted domains to impersonate legitimate companies and products.  


 


Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) along with partner teams have been tracking and gathering information on Barium, monitoring the group’s activities as they operate a number of websites, domains and internet-connected computers. You can read more about this in the September 2020 Microsoft Digital Defense report.


 


MSTIC has now shared many of these indicators (IP/domains) so that you can hunt for them in Azure Sentinel using relevant data like the newly integrated Microsoft 365 Defender data, DNS logs, Firewall data etc. Below are sample Azure Sentinel queries that you can run to check for Barium activity in your environment. 


 


Barium IP Indicators










id: 6ee72a9e-2e54-459c-bc9a-9c09a6502a63 

name: Known Barium IP 

description: | 

  ‘Identifies a match across various data feeds for IP IOCs related to the Barium activity group.  


severity: High 

requiredDataConnectors: 

  – connectorId: Office365 

    dataTypes: 

     – OfficeActivity 

  – connectorId: DNS 

    dataTypes: 

      – DnsEvents 

  – connectorId: AzureMonitor(VMInsights) 

    dataTypes: 

      – VMConnection 

  – connectorId: CiscoASA 

    dataTypes: 

      – CommonSecurityLog 

  – connectorId: PaloAltoNetworks 

    dataTypes: 

      – CommonSecurityLog 

  – connectorId: SecurityEvents 

    dataTypes: 

      – SecurityEvent 

  – connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory 

    dataTypes: 

      – SigninLogs 

  – connectorId: AzureMonitor(WireData) 

    dataTypes: 

      – WireData 

  – connectorId: AzureMonitor(IIS) 

    dataTypes: 

      – W3CIISLog 

  – connectorId: AzureActivity 

    dataTypes: 

      – AzureActivity 

  – connectorId: AWS 

    dataTypes: 

      – AWSCloudTrail 

  – connectorId: Microsoft 365 Defender 

    dataTypes: 

      – DeviceNetworkEvents 

queryFrequency: 1

queryPeriod: 1

triggerOperator: gt 

triggerThreshold: 0 

tactics: 

  – CommandAndControl 

query:  |  

let timeframe = 1d; 

  let IPList = dynamic([“216.24.185.74”“107.175.189.159”“192.210.132.102”“67.230.163.214”

“199.19.110.240”“107.148.130.176”“154.212.129.218”“172.86.75.54”“45.61.136.199”

“149.28.150.195”“108.61.214.194”“144.202.98.198”“149.28.84.98”“103.99.209.78”

“45.61.136.2”“176.122.162.149”“192.3.80.245”“149.28.23.32”“107.182.18.149”“107.174.45.134”

“149.248.18.104”“65.49.192.74”“156.255.2.154”“45.76.6.149”“8.9.11.130”“140.238.27.255”

“107.182.24.70”“176.122.188.254”“192.161.161.108”“64.64.234.24”“104.224.185.36”

“104.233.224.227”“104.36.69.105”“119.28.139.120”“161.117.39.130”“66.42.100.42”“45.76.31.159”

“149.248.8.134”“216.24.182.48”“66.42.103.222”“218.89.236.11”“180.150.227.249”“47.75.80.23”,

 “124.156.164.19”“149.248.62.83”“150.109.76.174”“222.209.187.207”“218.38.191.38”

“119.28.226.59”“66.42.98.220”“74.82.201.8”“173.242.122.198”“45.32.130.72”“89.35.178.10”

“89.43.60.113”]); 

  (union isfuzzy=true 

  (CommonSecurityLog 

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)  

  | where isnotempty(SourceIP) or isnotempty(DestinationIP) 

  | where SourceIP in (IPList) or DestinationIP in (IPList) or Message has_any (IPList) 

  | extend IPMatch = case(SourceIP in (IPList), “SourceIP”, DestinationIP in (IPList), “DestinationIP”

“Message”)  

  | summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by 

SourceIP, DestinationIP, DeviceProduct, DeviceAction, Message, Protocol, SourcePort, DestinationPort, 

DeviceAddress, DeviceName, IPMatch 

  | extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc, IPCustomEntity = case(IPMatch == “SourceIP”, SourceIP, 

IPMatch == “DestinationIP”, DestinationIP, “IP in Message Field”)  

  ), 

  (OfficeActivity 

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)  

  |extend SourceIPAddress = ClientIP, Account = UserId 

  | where  SourceIPAddress in (IPList) 

  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated , IPCustomEntity = SourceIPAddress , 

AccountCustomEntity = Account 

  ), 

  (DnsEvents  

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)  

  | extend DestinationIPAddress = IPAddresses,  Host = Computer 

  | where  DestinationIPAddress has_any (IPList)  

  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = DestinationIPAddress, 

HostCustomEntity = Host 

  ), 

  (VMConnection  

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)  

  | where isnotempty(SourceIp) or isnotempty(DestinationIp)  

  | where SourceIp in (IPList) or DestinationIp in (IPList)  

  | extend IPMatch = case( SourceIp in (IPList), “SourceIP”, DestinationIp in (IPList), 

“DestinationIP”“None”)  

  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated , IPCustomEntity = case(IPMatch == “SourceIP”,

 SourceIp, IPMatch == “DestinationIP”, DestinationIp, “None”), Host = Computer 

  ), 

  (Event 

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe) 

  | where Source == “Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon” 

  | where EventID == 3 

  | extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData) 

  | extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data 

  | extend SourceIP = EventDetail.[9].[“#text”], DestinationIP = EventDetail.[14].[“#text”

  | where SourceIP in (IPList) or DestinationIP in (IPList)  

  | extend IPMatch = case( SourceIP in (IPList), “SourceIP”, DestinationIP in (IPList), “DestinationIP”“None”)  

  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = UserName, HostCustomEntity = Computer , 

IPCustomEntity = case(IPMatch == “SourceIP”, SourceIP, IPMatch == “DestinationIP”, DestinationIP, “None”

  ),  

  (WireData  

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe) 

  | where isnotempty(RemoteIP) 

  | where RemoteIP in (IPList) 

  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = RemoteIP, HostCustomEntity = Computer 

  ), 

  (SigninLogs 

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe) 

  | where isnotempty(IPAddress) 

  | where IPAddress in (IPList) 

  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = UserPrincipalName, 

IPCustomEntity = IPAddress 

  ), 

  (W3CIISLog  

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe) 

  | where isnotempty(cIP) 

  | where cIP in (IPList) 

  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = cIP, HostCustomEntity = Computer, 

AccountCustomEntity = csUserName 

  ), 

  (AzureActivity  

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe) 

  | where isnotempty(CallerIpAddress) 

  | where CallerIpAddress in (IPList) 

  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = CallerIpAddress, AccountCustomEntity = Caller 

  ), 

  ( 

  AWSCloudTrail 

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe) 

  | where isnotempty(SourceIpAddress) 

  | where SourceIpAddress in (IPList) 

  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = 

SourceIpAddress, AccountCustomEntity = UserIdentityUserName 

  ), 

  ( 

  DeviceNetworkEvents 

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)  

  | where isnotempty(RemoteIP)  

  | where RemoteIP in (IPList)  

  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = RemoteIP, HostCustomEntity = DeviceName  

  ) 

  ) 



 


Barium Domain Indicators












id: 70b12a3b-4899-42cb-910c-5ffaf9d7997d 

name: Known Barium domains  

description: | 

  ‘Identifies a match across various data feeds for domains IOCs related to the Barium activity group.’ 


severity: High 

requiredDataConnectors: 

  – connectorId: DNS 

    dataTypes: 

      – DnsEvents 

  – connectorId: AzureMonitor(VMInsights)  

    dataTypes: 

      – VMConnection 

  – connectorId: CiscoASA 

    dataTypes: 

      – CommonSecurityLog 

  – connectorId: PaloAltoNetworks 

    dataTypes: 

      – CommonSecurityLog 

  – connectorId: Microsoft 365 Defender 

    dataTypes: 

      – DeviceNetworkEvents 

queryFrequency: 1

queryPeriod: 1

triggerOperator: gt 

triggerThreshold: 0 

tactics: 

  – CommandAndControl 

query:  |  

 



let timeframe = 1d; 

let DomainNames = dynamic([“0.ns1.dns-info.gq”“1.ns1.dns-info.gq”“10.ns1.dns-info.gq”“102.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“104.ns1.dns-info.gq”“11.ns1.dns-info.gq”“110.ns1.dns-info.gq”“115.ns1.dns-info.gq”“116.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“117.ns1.dns-info.gq”“118.ns1.dns-info.gq”“12.ns1.dns-info.gq”“120.ns1.dns-info.gq”“122.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“123.ns1.dns-info.gq”“128.ns1.dns-info.gq”“13.ns1.dns-info.gq”“134.ns1.dns-info.gq”“135.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“138.ns1.dns-info.gq”“14.ns1.dns-info.gq”“144.ns1.dns-info.gq”“15.ns1.dns-info.gq”“153.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“157.ns1.dns-info.gq”“16.ns1.dns-info.gq”“17.ns1.dns-info.gq”“18.ns1.dns-info.gq”“19.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“1a9604fa.ns1.feedsdns.com”“1c7606b6.ns1.steamappstore.com”“2.ns1.dns-info.gq”“20.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“201.ns1.dns-info.gq”“202.ns1.dns-info.gq”“204.ns1.dns-info.gq”“207.ns1.dns-info.gq”“21.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“210.ns1.dns-info.gq”“211.ns1.dns-info.gq”“216.ns1.dns-info.gq”“22.ns1.dns-info.gq”“220.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“223.ns1.dns-info.gq”“23.ns1.dns-info.gq”“24.ns1.dns-info.gq”“25.ns1.dns-info.gq”“26.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“27.ns1.dns-info.gq”“28.ns1.dns-info.gq”“29.ns1.dns-info.gq”“3.ns1.dns-info.gq”“30.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“31.ns1.dns-info.gq”“32.ns1.dns-info.gq”“33.ns1.dns-info.gq”“34.ns1.dns-info.gq”“35.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“36.ns1.dns-info.gq”“37.ns1.dns-info.gq”“39.ns1.dns-info.gq”“3d6fe4b2.ns1.steamappstore.com”

“4.ns1.dns-info.gq”“40.ns1.dns-info.gq”“42.ns1.dns-info.gq”“43.ns1.dns-info.gq”“44.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“45.ns1.dns-info.gq”“46.ns1.dns-info.gq”“48.ns1.dns-info.gq”“5.ns1.dns-info.gq”“50.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“50417.service.gstatic.dnset.com”“51.ns1.dns-info.gq”“52.ns1.dns-info.gq”“53.ns1.dns-info.gq”,

 “54.ns1.dns-info.gq”“55.ns1.dns-info.gq”“56.ns1.dns-info.gq”“57.ns1.dns-info.gq”“58.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“6.ns1.dns-info.gq”“60.ns1.dns-info.gq”“62.ns1.dns-info.gq”“63.ns1.dns-info.gq”“64.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“65.ns1.dns-info.gq”“67.ns1.dns-info.gq”“7.ns1.dns-info.gq”“70.ns1.dns-info.gq”“71.ns1.dns-info.gq”,

 “73.ns1.dns-info.gq”“77.ns1.dns-info.gq”“77075.service.gstatic.dnset.com”“7c1947fa.ns1.steamappstore.com”,

 “8.ns1.dns-info.gq”“81.ns1.dns-info.gq”“86.ns1.dns-info.gq”“87.ns1.dns-info.gq”“9.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“94343.service.gstatic.dnset.com”“9939.service.gstatic.dnset.com”“aa.ns.mircosoftdoc.com”

“aaa.feeds.api.ns1.feedsdns.com”“aaa.googlepublic.feeds.ns1.dns-info.gq”

“aaa.resolution.174547._get.cache.up.sourcedns.tk”“acc.microsoftonetravel.com”

“accounts.longmusic.com”“admin.dnstemplog.com”“agent.updatenai.com”

“alibaba.zzux.com”“api.feedsdns.com”“app.portomnail.com”“asia.updatenai.com”

“battllestategames.com”“bguha.serveuser.com”“binann-ce.com”“bing.dsmtp.com”

“blog.cdsend.xyz”“brives.minivineyapp.com”“bsbana.dynamic-dns.net”

“californiaforce.000webhostapp.com”“californiafroce.000webhostapp.com”

“cdn.freetcp.com”“cdsend.xyz”“cipla.zzux.com”“cloudfeeddns.com”“comcleanner.info”,

 “cs.microsoftsonline.net”“dns-info.gq”“dns05.cf”“dns22.ml”“dns224.com”

“dnsdist.org”“dnstemplog.com”“doc.mircosoftdoc.com”“dropdns.com”

“eshop.cdn.freetcp.com”“exchange.dumb1.com”“exchange.misecure.com”“exchange.mrbasic.com”,

 “facebookdocs.com”“facebookint.com”“facebookvi.com”“feed.ns1.dns-info.gq”“feedsdns.com”

“firejun.freeddns.com”“ftp.dns-info.dyndns.pro”“goallbandungtravel.com”“goodhk.azurewebsites.net”

“googlepublic.feed.ns1.dns-info.gq”“gp.spotifylite.cloud”“gskytop.com”“gstatic.dnset.com”

“gxxservice.com”“helpdesk.cdn.freetcp.com”“id.serveuser.com”“infestexe.com”“item.itemdb.com”,

 “m.mircosoftdoc.com”“mail.transferdkim.xyz”“mcafee.updatenai.com”“mecgjm.mircosoftdoc.com”,

 “microdocs.ga”“microsock.website”“microsocks.net”“microsoft.sendsmtp.com”

“microsoftbook.dns05.com”“microsoftcontactcenter.com”“microsoftdocs.dns05.com”“microsoftdocs.ml”

“microsoftonetravel.com”“microsoftonlines.net”“microsoftprod.com”“microsofts.dns1.us”“microsoftsonline.net”,

 “minivineyapp.com”“mircosoftdoc.com”“mircosoftdocs.com”“mlcrosoft.ninth.biz”“mlcrosoft.site”

“mm.portomnail.com”“msdnupdate.com”“msecdn.cloud”“mtnl1.dynamic-dns.net”“ns.gstatic.dnset.com”

“ns.microsoftprod.com”“ns.steamappstore.com”“ns1.cdn.freetcp.com”“ns1.comcleanner.info”“ns1.dns-info.gq”

“ns1.dns05.cf”“ns1.dnstemplog.com”“ns1.dropdns.com”“ns1.microsoftonetravel.com”

“ns1.microsoftonlines.net”“ns1.microsoftprod.com”“ns1.microsoftsonline.net”“ns1.mlcrosoft.site”

“ns1.teams.wikaba.com”“ns1.windowsdefende.com”“ns2.comcleanner.info”“ns2.dnstemplog.com”

“ns2.microsoftonetravel.com”“ns2.microsoftprod.com”“ns2.microsoftsonline.net”“ns2.mlcrosoft.site”

“ns2.windowsdefende.com”“ns3.microsoftprod.com”“ns3.mlcrosoft.site”“nutrition.mrbasic.com”

“nutrition.youdontcare.com”“online.mlcrosoft.site”“online.msdnupdate.com”“outlookservce.site”

“owa.jetos.com”“owa.otzo.com”“pornotime.co”“portomnail.com”

“post.1a0.066e063ac.7c1947fa.ns1.steamappstore.com”“pricingdmdk.com”“prod.microsoftprod.com”

“product.microsoftprod.com”“ptcl.yourtrap.com”“query.api.sourcedns.tk”“rb.itemdb.com”“redditcdn.com”

“rss.otzo.com”“secure.msdnupdate.com”“service.dns22.ml”“service.gstatic.dnset.com”“service04.dns04.com”

“settings.teams.wikaba.com”“sip.outlookservce.site”“sixindent.epizy.com”“soft.msdnupdate.com”“sourcedns.ml”

“sourcedns.tk”“sport.msdnupdate.com”“spotifylite.cloud”“static.misecure.com”“steamappstore.com”

“store.otzo.com”“survey.outlookservce.site”“team.itemdb.com”“temp221.com”“test.microsoftprod.com”

“thisisaaa.000webhostapp.com”“token.dns04.com”“token.dns05.com”“transferdkim.xyz”

“travelsanignacio.com”“update08.com”“updated08.com”“updatenai.com”“wantforspeed.com”,

 “web.mircosoftdoc.com”“webmail.pornotime.co”“webwhois.team.itemdb.com”“windowsdefende.com”“wnswindows.com”,

 “ashcrack.freetcp.com”“battllestategames.com”“binannce.com”“cdsend.xyz”“comcleanner.info”“microsock.website”

“microsocks.net”“microsoftsonline.net”“mlcrosoft.site”“notify.serveuser.com”“ns1.microsoftprod.com”

“ns2.microsoftprod.com”“pricingdmdk.com”“steamappstore.com”“update08.com”“wnswindows.com”

“youtube.dns05.com”“z1.zalofilescdn.com”“z2.zalofilescdn.com”“zalofilescdn.com”]); 

  (union isfuzzy=true 

  (CommonSecurityLog  

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)  

  | parse Message with * ‘(‘ DNSName ‘)’ *  

  | where DNSName in~ (DomainNames) 

  | extend Account = SourceUserID, Computer = DeviceName, IPAddress =  DestinationIP 

  ), 

  (DnsEvents  

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)  

  | extend DNSName = Name 

  | where isnotempty(DNSName) 

  | where DNSName  in~ (DomainNames) 

  | extend IPAddress =  ClientIP

  ), 

  (VMConnection  

  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)  

  | parse RemoteDnsCanonicalNames with * ‘[“‘ DNSName ‘”]’ * 

  | where isnotempty(DNSName) 

  | where DNSName  in~ (DomainNames) 

  | extend IPAddress = RemoteIp 

  ), 

  ( 

   DeviceNetworkEvents 

  | where isnotempty(RemoteUrl) 

  | where RemoteUrl  in~ (DomainNames)  

  | extend IPAddress = RemoteIP 

  | extend Computer = DeviceName 

  ) 

  ) 

  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Account, HostCustomEntity = Computer, IPCustomEntity = IPAddress 



 


References: 


https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-international-cyber-defendants-including-apt41-actors-charged-connection-computer 


https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/09/29/microsoft-digital-defense-report-cyber-threats/ 


https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/connect-microsoft-365-defender 


https://aka.ms/m365-sentinel-offer 


https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/what-s-new-microsoft-365-defender-connector-now-in-public/ba-p/1865651 


 

Brought to you by Dr. Ware, Microsoft Office 365 Silver Partner, Charleston SC.

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