Strengthening Cybersecurity of SATCOM Network Providers and Customers

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

Actions to Take Today:
• Use secure methods for authentication.
• Enforce principle of least privilege.
• Review trust relationships.
• Implement encryption.
• Ensure robust patching and system configuration audits.
• Monitor logs for suspicious activity.
• Ensure incident response, resilience, and continuity of operations plans are in place.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are aware of possible threats to U.S. and international satellite communication (SATCOM) networks. Successful intrusions into SATCOM networks could create risk in SATCOM network providers’ customer environments.

Given the current geopolitical situation, CISA’s Shields Up initiative requests that all organizations significantly lower their threshold for reporting and sharing indications of malicious cyber activity. To that end, CISA and FBI will update this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) as new information becomes available so that SATCOM providers and their customers can take additional mitigation steps pertinent to their environments.

CISA and FBI strongly encourages critical infrastructure organizations and other organizations that are either SATCOM network providers or customers to review and implement the mitigations outlined in this CSA to strengthen SATCOM network cybersecurity.

Click here for a PDF version of this report.

CISA and FBI strongly encourages critical infrastructure organizations and other organizations that are either SATCOM network providers or customers to review and implement the following mitigations:

Mitigations for SATCOM Network Providers

  • Put in place additional monitoring at ingress and egress points to SATCOM equipment to look for anomalous traffic, such as:
    • The presence of insecure remote access tools—such as Teletype Network Protocol (Telnet), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), Secure Copy Protocol (SCP), and Virtual Network Computing (VNC)—facilitating communications to and from SATCOM terminals.
    • Network traffic from SATCOM networks to other unexpected network segments.
    • Unauthorized use of local or backup accounts within SATCOM networks.
    • Unexpected SATCOM terminal to SATCOM terminal traffic.
    • Network traffic from the internet to closed group SATCOM networks.
    • Brute force login attempts over SATCOM network segments.
  • See the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 2022 for specific state-sponsored cyber threat activity relating to SATCOM networks.

Mitigations for SATCOM Network Providers and Customers

  • Use secure methods for authentication, including multifactor authentication where possible, for all accounts used to access, manage, and/or administer SATCOM networks. 
    • Use and enforce strong, complex passwords: Review password policies to ensure they align with the latest NIST guidelines
    • Do not use default credentials or weak passwords.
    • Audit accounts and credentials: remove terminated or unnecessary accounts; change expired credentials.
  • Enforce principle of least privilege through authorization policies. Minimize unnecessary privileges for identities. Consider privileges assigned to individual personnel accounts, as well as those assigned to non-personnel accounts (e.g., those assigned to software or systems). Account privileges should be clearly defined, narrowly scoped, and regularly audited against usage patterns.
  • Review trust relationships. Review existing trust relationships with IT service providers. Threat actors are known to exploit trust relationships between providers and their customers to gain access to customer networks and data.  
    • Remove unnecessary trust relationships. 
    • Review contractual relationships with all service providers. Ensure contracts include appropriate provisions addressing security, such as those listed below, and that these provisions are appropriately leveraged: 
      • Security controls the customer deems appropriate. 
      • Provider should have in place appropriate monitoring and logging of provider-managed customer systems.
      • Customer should have in place appropriate monitoring of the service provider’s presence, activities, and connections to the customer network.
      • Notification of confirmed or suspected security events and incidents occurring on the provider’s infrastructure and administrative networks.
  • Implement independent encryption across all communications links leased from, or provided by, your SATCOM provider. See National Security Agency (NSA) Cybersecurity Advisory: Protecting VSAT Communications for guidance.
  • Strengthen the security of operating systems, software, and firmware.
    • Ensure robust vulnerability management and patching practices are in place and, after testing, immediately patch known exploited vulnerabilities included in CISA’s living catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities carry significant risk to federal agencies as well as public and private sectors entities. 
    • Implement rigorous configuration management programs. Ensure the programs can track and mitigate emerging threats. Regularly audit system configurations for misconfigurations and security weaknesses.
  • Monitor network logs for suspicious activity and unauthorized or unusual login attempts.
    • Integrate SATCOM traffic into existing network security monitoring tools.
    • Review logs of systems behind SATCOM terminals for suspicious activity.
    • Ingest system and network generated logs into your enterprise security information and event management (SIEM) tool. 
    • Implement endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools where possible on devices behind SATCOM terminals, and ingest into the SIEM.
    • Expand and enhance monitoring of network segments and assets that use SATCOM.
    • Expand monitoring to include ingress and egress traffic transiting SATCOM links and monitor for suspicious or anomalous network activity. 
    • Baseline SATCOM network traffic to determine what is normal and investigate deviations, such as large spikes in traffic.
  • Create, maintain, and exercise a cyber incident response plan, resilience plan, and continuity of operations plan so that critical functions and operations can be kept running if technology systems—including SATCOM networks—are disrupted or need to be taken offline.

ISC Releases Security Advisories for BIND

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

The Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) has released security advisories that address vulnerabilities affecting multiple versions of ISC Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND). A remote attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to cause a denial-of-service condition.

CISA encourages users and administrators to review the following ISC advisories and apply the necessary updates or workarounds.

WordPress Releases Security Update

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

WordPress versions prior to 5.9.2 are affected by multiple vulnerabilities. Exploitation of some of these vulnerabilities could allow a remote attacker to take control of an affected website.

CISA encourages users and administrators to review the WordPress Security Release and upgrade to WordPress 5.9.2.

Web activity response timeout improvement

Web activity response timeout improvement

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

Web activity is helpful when invoking an external endpoint from within an ADF pipeline. While Azure Data Factory/ Synapse pipelines offer various orchestration activities, web activity helps provide extensibility when building data pipelines that span across different services. 


 


Web activities work exceptionally well with APIs that follow the asynchronous request-reply pattern, a suggested approach for building scalable web APIs/ services. In such scenarios, it automatically polls for the status endpoint (when it receives HTTP 202) till the API returns HTTP 200. It behaves synchronously and waits till the response is HTTP 200 before kicking off the down-stream activities. 


 

async-request.png



Most Azure-based APIs are async request-reply pattern and gels with the existing web activity behavior. 


 


Problem


But in case you have API endpoints that do not follow the above pattern and expect the caller to wait for a response till the processing/ actions are done. As default action, the web activity will timeout within 1 minute if it does not receive any response.  


 


Improvement


We are introducing a response timeout property ‘httpRequestTimeout’ in Web activity that will let you provide larger timeouts for such synchronous APIs.  


 


Screenshot 2022-03-17 at 9.33.41 AM.png



 


Reference: 


Web Activity – Azure Data Factory & Azure Synapse | Microsoft Docs

Benefit from Azure Arc-enabled SQL Managed Instance, even without a direct connection to Azure

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

Azure SQL Managed Instance is an intelligent, secure, and scalable cloud database service with the broadest SQL Server engine compatibility with all the benefits of a fully managed and evergreen platform as a service. With Azure Arc, you will now be able to deploy, manage, and monitor Azure SQL Managed Instance in an environment of your choice, outside of Azure. Azure Arc-enabled SQL Managed Instance has near 100% compatibility with the latest SQL Server database engine, and it will enable existing customers to lift and shift their applications to Azure Arc data services with minimal application and database changes while maintaining data sovereignty. 


 


Azure Arc-enabled SQL Managed Instance can be deployed at the edge, in your own datacenter, and in public clouds using Kubernetes and the infrastructure of your choice. Azure Arc-enabled SQL MI receives updates on a frequent basis, including servicing patches and new features similar to the experience in Azure. You will be able to scale your databases up and down dynamically in very much the same way you would do it in Azure, depending on the available capacity and resources of your Kubernetes clusters. 


 


Azure Arc-enabled SQL Managed Instance provides also other cloud benefits such as fast deployment and automation at scale. You will also be able to use familiar tools such as Azure portal, Azure Data Studio, and Azure CLI when you deploy, manage, and monitor your Azure SQL Managed Instance in your own environment, and you will be able to use tools like Azure Monitor for comprehensive operational insights across all your databases across hybrid and multicloud environments. 


 


Directly connected mode is one of the two different connectivity modes in Azure Arc-enabled data services. In this connectivity mode billing and inventory data is sent to Azure automatically. The data in your databases is never sent to Azure. 


 


How about a scenario where your data center does not allow connectivity to any public internet, or you have an edge location which does not have connectivity to the Internet, or the connectivity may be intermittent with long periods of outages?


 


In this scenario, you can deploy Azure Arc data controller in indirectly connected mode. Most of the services such as self-service provisioning, automated backups/restore, and monitoring can be run locally in your Kubernetes infrastructure. You would be using tools such as Azure Data Studio, Azure CLI, or Kubernetes native tools for self-service provisioning. Automatic upgrades and patching can be implemented by pulling the container images of Azure Arc-enabled SQL MI from Microsoft Container Registry, and pushing them to a local, private container registry that the data controller has access to. 


 


Indirectly connected mode supports automatic local backup and restore, and you can use the locally deployed Grafana and Kibana dashboards for monitoring. 


 


Read more about the connectivity modes of Azure Arc data services and try out Azure Arc-enabled SQL Managed in your own environment!


 


Marko Hotti


Sr. Technical Product Manager


Azure Arc-enabled SQL MI and SQL Server


Azure Data