#JulyOT 2022 -31 days of IoT content for everyone starting 1st July

#JulyOT 2022 -31 days of IoT content for everyone starting 1st July

by | Jul 3, 2022 | Technology

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

Animated July O T logoAnimated July O T logo


 


#JulyOT is back for 2022! Throughout the month of July, the IoT teams at Microsoft will be sharing content and events put together by IoT enthusiasts from around the world.  This includes content from community members, Microsoft employees, and could even involve you!   For every working day in July, we’ll focus on one or more featured content pieces from our curated collection at the new home of #JulyOT – JulyOT.dev!.  The idea is to inspire those curious about IoT to pursue their own personal projects within the realm of Internet of Things, and then share them on social media with the hashtag #JulyOT.


 


We’ll be updating JulyOT.dev with new content every working day in July, so check back there often, or subscribe to the RSS feed. We’ll also be updating this post at the end of each week with a round up of what we covered in that week.


 


IoT live streams


 


IoT for Beginners Reactor stream logoIoT for Beginners Reactor stream logo


 JulyOT kicks off with live streams from the Microsoft Reactor. Check out our events page to learn more and register. These include the first 4 lessons of IoT for Beginners, our free, open source IoT curriculum, as well as live streams in English and Spanish.


 


IoT Cloud Skills Challenge


A cartoon raccoon holding medalsA cartoon raccoon holding medals


We’ll also challenge y’all to grow your IoT skills with a cloud skills challenge! More details coming on the 1st July.


 


Digital swag


What better way to celebrate #JulyOT than with digital swag! Set your desktop or video chat background, and get cool visuals to share on social on our digital swag page.


 


Enjoy the celebration of #JulyOT


See you all at JulyOT.dev as we celebrate #JulyOT.


 


 

Recommendations for Oracle 19c Patches in Azure

Recommendations for Oracle 19c Patches in Azure

by | Jul 1, 2022 | Technology

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

Oracle 19c is the terminal release for Oracle 12c.  If you aren’t familiar with that term, a terminal release is the last point release of the product.  There were terminal releases for previous Oracle versions (10.2.0.4, 11.2.0.7.0) and after 19c, the next terminal release will be 23c.  Therefore, you don’t see many 18c, 20c or 21c databases.  We’ve gone to yearly release numbers, but the fact remains that 19c is going to receive all major updates and continue to be supported unlike the non-terminal releases.


 


Oracle will tell you for support, you should be upgrading to 19c.  Premier Oracle Support ended for December 1st, 2020 and as we discussed, not many are going to choose or stay on non-terminal releases, so 19c is it.


 


upgrade.gif


With that said, we must offer guidance on recommended practices for Oracle versioning and patching in Azure.  Although I will list any bugs and document IDs that back up the recommendations I’m making, be aware that many of these will be behind Oracle Support’s paywall, so you’ll only be able to access them with an Oracle Support CSI.  Let’s talk about the things not to do first-


Don’t Upgrade DURING Your Migration


I know it sounds like an awesome idea to upgrade to the latest database version while you are migrating to the cloud, but please, don’t do these two things- migrating to the cloud and upgrading the database/app at the same time.  It’s a common scenario that I’m brought in after the Azure specialists are left scratching their head or scrambling to explain what has changed and then I come in to tell them to stand down because it’s the DATABASE THAT’S CHANGED. 


 


Do Patch to the LATEST Patchset for Oracle


I am part of the crowd that often did the latest patchset -1 approach.  We would always be one patchset behind and let others figure out how many bugs might be introduced by the patch that had sneaked through testing. 


 


Not anymore… I have a few customers on 19.14, which should be safe, considering the previous practice I mentioned, but the sheer number of bugs and serious bugs that were experienced has changed my thinking to recommend going to the latest patchset.


 


I think it’s easy to think, “Oh, it’s just a small bug” but I’m in agreement with you, if it’s a small impact and it has an easy work around, that’s one thing, but these bugs I’m referring to are quite impactful and here’s how:


High CPU Usage



  • 19.14 release, there were 11 bugs that caused high CPU usage for Oracle.

  • High CPU usage to the point of doubling the core count for the VM the database ran on in Azure.

  • Doubling the need for Oracle licenses for the database, even though it was a bug that was causing all the additional CPU usage.

  • At $47500 list price per processor license, this isn’t something I’d recommend letting go on.


For one customer that I was deeply involved in, the VM sizing required 20 vCPU to run the workload.  I sized up to 32 vCPU for peak workloads and yet they were at 97.6% CPU busy with a 64-core machine.  The workload hadn’t changed, and the CPU usage traced was out of control!


I would start here: After Upgrade to 19c, One or More of the Following Issues Occur on Non-Linux Platforms: High Paging/Swapping, High CPU, Poor Performance, ORA-27nnn Errors, ORA-00379 Errors, ORA-04036 Errors (Doc ID 2762216.1)


 


Bug examples for high CPU usage in 19.14:


























































































NB

Prob

Bug

Fixed

Description
 

II

31050103

19.15, 23.1.0.0.0

fbda: slow sql performance when running in pluggable database
 

–

32869560

19.15, 21.6

HIGH CPU ON KXSGETRUNTIMELOCK AND SSKGSLCAS
 

I

29446010

20.1

Query Using LIKE Predicate Spins Using NLS_SORT=’japanese_m’ NLS_COMP=’linguistic’
 

–

32431067

23.1.0.0.0

Data Pump Export is Slow When Exporting Scheduler Jobs Due to Query Against SYS.KU$_PROCOBJ_VIEW
 

–

33380871

19.15, 21.6

High CPU on KSLWT_UPDATE_STATS_ELEM
 

–

33921441

19.15

Slow performance in AQ dequeue processing

*

II

32075777


  

Performance degradation by Wnnn processes after applying july 2020 DBRU
 

III

32164034


  

Database Hang Updating USER$ When LSLT (LAST SUCCESSFUL LOGIN TIME) Is Enabled
 

III

30664385


  

High count of repetitive executions for sql_id 35c8afbgfm40c during incremental statistics gathering
 

II

29559415


  

DMLs on FDA enabled tables are slow, or potential deadlocks on recursive DML on SYS_FBA_* tables
 

II

29448426

20.1

Killing Sessions in PDB Eventually Results in Poor Buffer Cache Performance Due To Miscalculating Free Buffer Count

 


Time Slip


This issue will often display an ORA-00800 error and you will need to check the extended trace file for details.  It will include the VKTM in the error arguments.


 


…/trace/xxxxx_vktm_xxxx.trc


ORA-00800: soft external error, arguments: [Set Priority Failed], [VKTM], [Check traces and OS configuration], [Check Oracle document and MOS notes]

The trace file will include additional information about the error, including:


Kstmmainvktm: failed in setting elevated priority

Verify: SETUID is set on ORADISM and restart the instance highres_enabled

 


This refers to a bug and has two documents around time drift and how to address it-


ORA-00800: soft external error, arguments: [Set Priority Failed], [VKTM] (Doc ID 2718971.1)


I’d also refer to this doc, even though you aren’t running AIX:


Bug 28831618 : FAILED TO ELEVATE VKTM’S PRIORITY IN AIX WITH EVENT 10795 SET


 


Network Connection Timeouts


Incident alerting will occur in the alert log, and it will require viewing the corresponding trace file for the incident.


 


ORA-03137: malformed TTC packet from client rejected.

ORA-03137: Malformed TTC Packet From Client Rejected: [12569] (Doc ID 2498924.1)


Potential Tracing to gather more data:


Getting ORA-12569: TNS:Packet Checksum Failure While Trying To Connect Through Client (Doc ID 257793.1)


 


Block Corruption


Thanks to Jeff Steiner from the NetApp team who advised on this one.


Bug 32931941 – Fractured block Corruption Found while Using DirectNFS (Doc ID 32931941.8)



  • This can result in 100’s to 1000’s of corrupted blocks in an Oracle database.

  • All customers using dNFS with 19c should run 19.14 or higher to avoid being vulnerable to this bug.


Also follow the Recommended Patches for Direct NFS Client (Doc ID 1495104.1)


Summary


If you’re considering an upgrade to Oracle 19c, please review the following Oracle Doc:


Things to Consider to Avoid Database Performance Problems on 19c (Doc ID 2773012.1)


It really is worth your time and can save you a lot of time and headache.


 

Row Level Security in Power BI Desktop

Row Level Security in Power BI Desktop

by | Jul 1, 2022 | Technology

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

Picture1.png


 


 


The Same KPIs, Different Department


 


Scenario: You have different managers requesting to see the same KPIs (Customer Count, Revenue Generated, Products Performance, etc) for their different region. Data privacy requires that the various managers only see reports for their regions. A simple way to think about this is by creating different reports for the managers making a total of 3 Reports. 


 


I am sure you will agree with me that this isn’t effective. more efforts and it is not scalable. what if it is a large multinational – country manager, regional manager, group manager, unit head, team leads all across the world? will you also build different reports for over 500 people? With Row Level Security, you can easily address this challenge by building a single Reports and set roles and rules to filter what everyone can see.


 


 


Learn and Practice Along here:


 


 


 


Additional Resources



 


 

CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog

by | Jul 1, 2022 | Security, Technology

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. These types of vulnerabilities are a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risk to the federal enterprise. Note: to view the newly added vulnerabilities in the catalog, click on the arrow in the “Date Added to Catalog” column, which will sort by descending dates.

Note: CISA previously added and then removed today’s addition, CVE-2022-26925, to the KEV Catalog after determining that remediations associated with this vulnerability would break certificate authentication for many federal agencies. Details:

  • CVE-2022-26925 was mitigated by Microsoft’s June 2022 Patch Tuesday update. 
  • The Microsoft update also includes remediations for CVE-2022-26923 and CVE-2022-26931, which change the way certificates are mapped to accounts in Active Directory. These changes break certificate authentication for many federal agencies.
  • For this reason, CISA has also published a Knowledge Article that provides critical steps that must be followed to prevent service outages. Agencies should review this Knowledge Article carefully before beginning the mitigation process.

Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog as a living list of known CVEs that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires FCEB agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information.    
  
Although BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the Catalog that meet the specified criteria.    

#StopRansomware: MedusaLocker

by | Jun 30, 2022 | Security, Technology

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

Summary

Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:
• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
• Enable and enforce multifactor authentication.

Note: this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of the Treasury, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) are releasing this CSA to provide information on MedusaLocker ransomware. Observed as recently as May 2022, MedusaLocker actors predominantly rely on vulnerabilities in Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to access victims’ networks. The MedusaLocker actors encrypt the victim’s data and leave a ransom note with communication instructions in every folder containing an encrypted file. The note directs victims to provide ransomware payments to a specific Bitcoin wallet address. MedusaLocker appears to operate as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model based on the observed split of ransom payments. Typical RaaS models involve the ransomware developer and various affiliates that deploy the ransomware on victim systems. MedusaLocker ransomware payments appear to be consistently split between the affiliate, who receives 55 to 60 percent of the ransom; and the developer, who receives the remainder. 

Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 633 kb

Technical Details

MedusaLocker ransomware actors most often gain access to victim devices through vulnerable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) configurations [T1133]. Actors also frequently use email phishing and spam email campaigns—directly attaching the ransomware to the email—as initial intrusion vectors [T1566].

MedusaLocker ransomware uses a batch file to execute PowerShell script invoke-ReflectivePEInjection [T1059.001]. This script propagates MedusaLocker throughout the network by editing the EnableLinkedConnections value within the infected machine’s registry, which then allows the infected machine to detect attached hosts and networks via Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and to detect shared storage via Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol. 

MedusaLocker then: 

  • Restarts the LanmanWorkstation service, which allows registry edits to take effect. 
  • Kills the processes of well-known security, accounting, and forensic software. 
  • Restarts the machine in safe mode to avoid detection by security software [T1562.009].
  • Encrypts victim files with the AES-256 encryption algorithm; the resulting key is then encrypted with an RSA-2048 public key [T1486]. 
  • Runs every 60 seconds, encrypting all files except those critical to the functionality of the victim’s machine and those that have the designated encrypted file extension. 
  • Establishes persistence by copying an executable (svhost.exe or svhostt.exe) to the %APPDATA%Roaming directory and scheduling a task to run the ransomware every 15 minutes. 
  • Attempts to prevent standard recovery techniques by deleting local backups, disabling startup recovery options, and deleting shadow copies [T1490].

MedusaLocker actors place a ransom note into every folder containing a file with the victim’s encrypted data. The note outlines how to communicate with the MedusaLocker actors, typically providing victims one or more email address at which the actors can be reached. The size of MedusaLocker ransom demands appears to vary depending on the victim’s financial status as perceived by the actors. 
 

Indicators of Compromise

Encrypted File Extensions
.1btc .matlock20 .marlock02 .readinstructions
.bec .mylock .jpz.nz .marlock11
.cn .NET1 .key1 .fileslocked
.datalock .NZ .lock .lockfilesUS
.deadfilesgr .tyco .lockdata7 .rs
.faratak .uslockhh .lockfiles .tyco
.fileslock .zoomzoom .perfection .uslockhh
.marlock13 n.exe .Readinstruction .marlock08
.marlock25 nt_lock20 .READINSTRUCTION  
.marlock6 .marlock01 .ReadInstructions  
Ransom Note File Names
how_to_ recover_data.html  how_to_recover_data.html.marlock01
instructions.html  READINSTRUCTION.html 
!!!HOW_TO_DECRYPT!!! How_to_recovery.txt
readinstructions.html  readme_to_recover_files
recovery_instructions.html  HOW_TO_RECOVER_DATA.html
recovery_instruction.html  

 

Payment Wallets
14oxnsSc1LZ5M2cPZeQ9rFnXqEvPCnZikc 
1DRxUFhvJjGUdojCzMWSLmwx7Qxn79XbJq 
18wRbb94CjyTGkUp32ZM7krCYCB9MXUq42 
1AbRxRfP6yHePpi7jmDZkS4Mfpm1ZiatH5
1Edcufenw1BB4ni9UadJpQh9LVx9JGtKpP
1DyMbw6R9PbJqfUSDcK5729xQ57yJrE8BC 
184ZcAoxkvimvVZaj8jZFujC7EwR3BKWvf 
14oH2h12LvQ7BYBufcrY5vfKoCq2hTPoev
bc1qy34v0zv6wu0cugea5xjlxagsfwgunwkzc0xcjj
bc1q9jg45a039tn83jk2vhdpranty2y8tnpnrk9k5q
bc1qz3lmcw4k58n79wpzm550r5pkzxc2h8rwmmu6xm
1AereQUh8yjNPs9Wzeg1Le47dsqC8NNaNM
1DeNHM2eTqHp5AszTsUiS4WDHWkGc5UxHf
1HEDP3c3zPwiqUaYuWZ8gBFdAQQSa6sMGw
1HdgQM9bjX7u7vWJnfErY4MWGBQJi5mVWV
1nycdn9ebxht4tpspu4ehpjz9ghxlzipll
12xd6KrWVtgHEJHKPEfXwMVWuFK4k1FCUF
1HZHhdJ6VdwBLCFhdu7kDVZN9pb3BWeUED
1PormUgPR72yv2FRKSVY27U4ekWMKobWjg
14cATAzXwD7CQf35n8Ea5pKJPfhM6jEHak
1PopeZ4LNLanisswLndAJB1QntTF8hpLsD
Email Addresses
willyhill1960@tutanota[.]com  unlockfile@cock[.]li
zlo@keem[.]ne  unlockmeplease@airmail[.]cc 
zlo@keemail[.]me  unlockmeplease@protonmail[.]com 
zlo@tfwno[.]gf  willyhill1960@protonmail[.]com 
support@ypsotecs[.]com support@imfoodst[.]com 
Email Addresses
traceytevin@protonmail[.]com  support@itwgset[.]com
unlock_file@aol[.]com  support@novibmaker[.]com
unlock_file@outlook[.]com  support@securycasts[.]com 
support@exoprints[.]com rewmiller-1974@protonmail[.]com
support@exorints[.]com  rpd@keemail[.]me
support@fanbridges[.]com  soterissylla@wyseil[.]com 
support@faneridges[.]com support@careersill[.]com 
perfection@bestkoronavirus[.]com  karloskolorado@tutanota[.]com
pool1256@tutanota[.]com  kevynchaz@protonmail[.]com 
rapid@aaathats3as[.]com korona@bestkoronavirus[.]com
rescuer@tutanota[.]com lockPerfection@gmail[.]com
ithelp01@decorous[.]cyou lockperfection@gmail[.]com 
ithelp01@wholeness[.]business mulierfagus@rdhos[.]com
ithelp02@decorous[.]cyou [rescuer]@cock[.]li 
ithelp02@wholness[.]business 107btc@protonmail[.]com 
ithelpresotre@outlook[.]com 33btc@protonmail[.]com 
cmd@jitjat[.]org  777decoder777@protonmail[.]com
coronaviryz@gmail[.]com 777decoder777@tfwno[.]gf
dec_helper@dremno[.]com andrewmiller-1974@protonmail[.]com
dec_helper@excic[.]com  angelomartin-1980@protonmail[.]com
dec_restore@prontonmail[.]com  ballioverus@quocor[.]com
dec_restore1@outlook[.]com beacon@jitjat[.]org
bitcoin@sitesoutheat[.]com  beacon@msgsafe[.]io
briansalgado@protonmail[.]com best666decoder@tutanota[.]com 
bugervongir@outlook[.]com bitcoin@mobtouches[.]com 
best666decoder@protonmail[.]com  encrypt2020@outlook[.]com 
decoder83540@cock[.]li fast-help@inbox[.]lv
decra2019@gmail[.]com  fuc_ktheworld1448@outlook[.]com
diniaminius@winrof[.]com  fucktheworld1448@cock[.]li
dirhelp@keemail[.]me  gartaganisstuffback@gmail[.]com 
Email Addresses
emaila.elaich@iav.ac[.]ma gavingonzalez@protonmail[.]com
emd@jitjat[.]org gsupp@onionmail[.]org
encrypt2020@cock[.]li  gsupp@techmail[.]info
best666decoder@protonmail[.]com  helper@atacdi[.]com 
ithelp@decorous[.]cyou helper@buildingwin[.]com 
ithelp@decorous[.]cyoum helprestore@outlook[.]com
ithelp@wholeness[.]business helptorestore@outlook[.]com
TOR Addresses
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/6-iSm1B1Ehljh8HYuXGym4Xyu1WdwsR2Av-6tXiw1BImsqoLh7pd207Rl6XYoln7sId 
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/8-grp514hncgblilsjtd32hg6jtbyhlocr5pqjswxfgf2oragnl3pqno6fkqcimqin
http://gvlay6y4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMETPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-XmBgZLWlm5ULGFCOJFuVdEymmxysofwu
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/2l-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHeOrxjtE9lck1MuXPYo29daQys6gomZZXUImN7Z 
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-DcaE9HeHywqSHvdcIwOndCS4PuWASX8g 
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-kB4rQXGKyxGiLyw7YDsMKSBjyfdwcyxo
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-bET6JbB9vEMZ7qYBPqUMCxOQExFx4iOi 
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5. onion/8-MO0Q7O97Hgxvm1YbD7OMnimImZJXEWaG-RbH4TvdwVTGQB3X6VOUOP3lgO6YOJEOW
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/8-gRp514hncgb1i1sjtD32hG6jTbUh1ocR-Uola2Fo30KTJvZX0otYZgTh5txmKwUNe 
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-E6UQFCEuCn4KvtAh4TonRTpyHqFo6F6L-OWQwD1w1Td7hY7IGUUjxmHMoFSQW6blg 
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-E6UQFCEuCn4KvtAh4TonRTpyHqFo6F6L-uGHwkkWCoUtBbZWN50sSS4Ds8RABkrKy 
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-E6UQFCEuCn4KvtAh4TonRTpyHqFo6F6L-Tj3PRnQlpHc9OftRVDGAWUulvE80yZbc 
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/8-Ww5sCBhsL8eM4PeAgsfgfa9lrqa81r31-tDQRZCAUe4164X532j9Ky16IBN9StWTH 
http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-wIq5kK9gGKiTmyups1U6fABj1VnXIYRB-I5xek6PG2EbWlPC7C1rXfsqJBlWlFFfY
qd7pcafncosqfqu3ha6fcx4h6sr7tzwagzpcdcnytiw3b6varaeqv5yd.onion
http://medusacegu2ufmc3kx2kkqicrlcxdettsjcenhjena6uannk5f4ffuyd.onion/leakdata/[REDACTED]

Disclaimer: Many of these observed IP addresses are several years old and have been historically linked to MedusaLocker ransomware. We recommend these IP addresses be investigated or vetted by organizations prior to taking action, such as blocking.

IP Address Last Observed
195.123.246.138 Nov-2021
138.124.186.221 Nov-2021
159.223.0.9 Nov-2021
45.146.164.141 Nov-2021
185.220.101.35 Nov-2021
185.220.100.249 Sep-2021
50.80.219.149 Sep-2021
185.220.101.146 Sep-2021
185.220.101.252 Sep-2021
179.60.150.97 Sep-2021
84.38.189.52 Sep-2021
94.232.43.63 Jul-2021
108.11.30.103 Apr-2021
194.61.55.94 Apr-2021
198.50.233.202 Apr-2021
40.92.90.105 Jan-2021
188.68.216.23 Dec-2020
87.251.75.71 Dec-2020
196.240.57.20 Oct-2020
198.0.198.5 Aug-2020
194.5.220.122 Mar-2020
194.5.250.124 Mar-2020
194.5.220.124 Mar-2020
104.210.72.161 Nov-2019

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

MedusaLocker actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 1.

Table 1: MedusaLocker Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise

Initial Access
Technique Title ID Use
External Remote Services T1133 MedusaLocker actors gained access to victim devices through vulnerable RDP configurations.
Phishing T1566 MedusaLocker actors used phishing and spearphishing to obtain access to victims’ networks.
Execution
Technique Title ID Use
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

T1059.001

 MedusaLocker actors may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution.
Defense Evasion
Technique Title ID Use
Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot

T1562.009

 MedusaLocker actors may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services.
Impact
Technique Title ID Use
Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 MedusaLocker actors encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
Inhibit System Recovery T1490 MedusaLocker actors may deny access to operating systems containing features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair.

Mitigations

  • Implement a recovery plan that maintains and retains multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, or the cloud).
  • Implement network segmentation and maintain offline backups of data to ensure limited interruption to the organization.
  • Regularly back up data and password protect backup copies stored offline. Ensure copies of critical data are not accessible for modification or deletion from the system where the data resides.
  • Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
  • Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as possible.
  • Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.
  • Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege. 
  • Disable unused ports.
  • Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.
  • Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
  • Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA).
  • Use National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies:
    • Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length.
    • Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.
    • Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials.
    • Avoid reusing passwords.
    • Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts.
    • Disable password “hints”.
    • Refrain from requiring password changes unless there is evidence of password compromise. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords and no longer require regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
    • Require administrator credentials to install software.
  • Only use secure networks; avoid using public Wi-Fi networks.
  • Consider installing and using a virtual private network (VPN) to establish secure remote connections.
  • Focus on cybersecurity awareness and training. Regularly provide users with training on information security principles and techniques as well as overall emerging cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities, such as ransomware and phishing scams.

 
Resources

  • Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
  • Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide
  • No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment

Reporting

  • To report an incident and request technical assistance, contact CISA at cisaservicedesk@cisa.dhs.gov or 888-282-0870, or FBI through a local field office. 
  • Financial Institutions must ensure compliance with any applicable Bank Secrecy Act requirements, including suspicious activity reporting obligations. Indicators of compromise (IOCs), such as suspicious email addresses, file names, hashes, domains, and IP addresses, can be provided under Item 44 of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) form. For more information on mandatory and voluntary reporting of cyber events via SARs, see FinCEN Advisory FIN-2016-A005, Advisory to Financial Institutions on Cyber-Events and Cyber-Enabled Crime, October 25, 2016; and FinCEN Advisory FIN-2021-A004, Advisory on Ransomware and the Use of the Financial System to Facilitate Ransom Payments, November 8, 2021, which updates FinCEN Advisory FIN-2020-A006.
  • The U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to $10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical infrastructure. See the RFJ website for more information and how to report information securely.

Contact Information

To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To report incidents and anomalous activity or to request incident response resources or technical assistance related to this threat, contact CISA at report@cisa.gov.

Revisions

June 30, 2022: Initial Version

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