Getting Error 666 when creating non-clustered index- Msg 666, Level 16, State 2, Line 25

Getting Error 666 when creating non-clustered index- Msg 666, Level 16, State 2, Line 25

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

Issue


A backend compatibility issue was encountered recently when the creation of a non-clustered index on a partitioned table of a hyper-scale Azure SQL DB failed with the error 666. The table in question had almost 3.5 Billion records and already had a clustered Index & 3 other non-clustered indexes present. You may receive an error as shown below:


Tanayankar_Chakraborty_0-1668184939243.png


 


Error


In addition to the error above- here is the error text Msg 666, Level 16, State 2, Line 25 The maximum system-generated unique value for a duplicate group was exceeded for the index with partition ID. Dropping and re-creating the index may resolve this; otherwise, use another clustering key.;


 


Workaround/Mitigation


Customers hitting this problem often are recommended to try running the index creation process at compatibility level 160 (instead of the current compatibility level) as the compatibility level 150 or below might use a spool that is directly associated with uniqueifier identifiers that have a max limit of 2,147,483,648. If this limit is reached the index creation fails with the error mentioned above. (Please note that compatibility level could be just one of the factors that may govern the use of a spool) Here is the difference in explain plans when we use compatibility level 160 vs compatibility level 150 (In the current case), notice the index spool (Highlighted in blue)


Tanayankar_Chakraborty_1-1668185020246.png


 


For database tables having billions of rows even using compatibility level, 160 may not be sufficient as the index creation process may not encounter the error 666 mentioned above but can eventually time out if the create index transaction exceeds 1 TB in the generated transaction log.


The workaround for the same is to make index creation Online & resumable by specifying ONLINE=ON, RESUMABLE=ON. With this, the operation will use many smaller transactions, and it will be possible to resume it from the failure point if it fails for any other reason. Using resumable operations is one of the best practices with large tables. It should also be noted that the database scoped configuration ELEVATE_ONLINE is set to OFF during the index creation process (The default value of ELEVATE_ONLINE is OFF).


In some cases, if the customer has concerns about changing the compatibility level to 160 for the database, we can also recommend them to change the compatibility level of the DB to 160 just before the index creation process, then trigger the create Index statement and then change the compatibility level of the DB back to 150 (After verifying the Index creation process has started successfully).


 



Please note that resuming a failed index creation is a manual operation. You can do that by re-executing the original CREATE INDEX command, it will pick up from the point where it failed. Note that by default, paused resumable operations time out after 24 hours. You can control that using the PAUSED_RESUMABLE_INDEX_ABORT_DURATION_MINUTES database-scoped configuration.


It is worthwhile keeping in mind, that for some Big partitioned tables, the rate of progress of the index creation process could be slow if the table has fewer populated partitions. In the test case seen above, the table only had 2 populated partitions & the current plan was running with parallelism (DOP 8), allocating one thread per partition for a total of 8 (plus one coordinator). But there were only two partitions and since one of them is smaller, it had already been processed. So effectively this was running single-threaded now, reading data from the single remaining partition. The index creation process is usually faster if the data is less skewed in partitions in which case the process could even be made faster by adding MAXDOP=16 to the create index statement.


 


Monitoring the error


It is always recommended to monitor such index creation processes periodically to ensure they are progressing well and are not being blocked by any other processes. Here are some of the DMVs that can help monitoring such an index creation process:



  1. The actual plan for the CREATE INDEX while it is running can be captured, using sys.dm_exec_query_statistics_xml (Transact-SQL) – SQL Server 

  2. It is always recommended to Check resource utilization in sys.dm_db_resource_stats a few minutes after starting to create the index. If anything (other than memory and log IO) is above 80%, you may want to increase cores even higher.

  3. The progress of the Index creation can be tracked via sys.index_resumable_operations. A sample output looks like this:Tanayankar_Chakraborty_2-1668185190418.png

     



  4. More info on waits can be obtained by querying the DMV sys.dm_exec_session_wait_stats

  5. The DMV sys.dm_exec_requests indicates if the create Index statement is blocked.

  6. If we want to check on any wait types and blocking, the DMV sys.dm_os_waiting_tasks can be very helpful.


 


More details can be found in the articles below:


10410305-1.v1 JSP Webshell

10410305-1.v1 JSP Webshell

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

Notification

This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:CLEAR–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:CLEAR information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.cisa.gov/tlp.

Summary

Description

CISA received 3 Java Server Pages (JSP) webshells for analysis from an organization where cyber actors exploited vulnerabilities against Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS). Four CVEs are currently being leveraged against ZCS: CVE-2022-24682, CVE-2022-27924, CVE-2022-27925 chained with CVE-2022-37042, and CVE-2022-30333. The files are server side code that allow clients to remotely send commands to be executed on the victim web server.

For more information on cyber actors exploiting vulnerabilities in ZCS, see joint CSA: Threat Actors Exploiting Multiple CVEs Against Zimbra Collaboration Suite.

Download the PDF version of this report: MAR-10410305.r1.v1.CLEAR, 537 KB

Submitted Files (3)

14bf0cbee88507fb016d01e3ced053858410c389be022d2aa4d075287c781c4a (hiall.jsp)

814a169ba97b168f95af3340b60a6fec1f29c87be89226b1966d9b0abfb19a15 (aes.jsp)

bc5b1f588cd506a69c03a7980a363846fa474b78e6946fa90e58d735c65f2bb6 (cmd.jsp)

Findings

bc5b1f588cd506a69c03a7980a363846fa474b78e6946fa90e58d735c65f2bb6

Tags

backdoortrojanwebshell

Details
Name cmd.jsp
Size 976 bytes
Type HTML document, ASCII text, with very long lines, with no line terminators
MD5 91de296c801db00a24a2832b5e12d345
SHA1 010aee65009b9faeb3a4e24ca777d3aaa51b0bd3
SHA256 bc5b1f588cd506a69c03a7980a363846fa474b78e6946fa90e58d735c65f2bb6
SHA512 673a100072df4be4bb73828dde5b04d68b3aa59a78f1af42594e5771620ad4205389ff4d83456faa5262cd780e69deef7f34fe03757531cabb7faac093ad2546
ssdeep 24:gzYIRLk+nn9IH/v+xVnVjQ4vajJHG3c3FvcVsUveakUSg:gh9cgVGo3c9cuakvg
Entropy 5.251748
Antivirus
ESET Java/JSP.AC trojan
Trend Micro Backdoo.E99CED14
Trend Micro HouseCall Backdoo.E99CED14
YARA Rules
  • rule CISA_10400779_07 : webshell    
    {
       meta:
           Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
           Incident = “10400779”
           Date = “2022-08-29”
           Last_Modified = “20220908_1400”
           Actor = “n/a”
           Category = “Webshell”
           Family = “n/a”
           Description = “Detects JSP Webshell samples”
           MD5 = “6f1c2dd27e28a52eb09cdd2bc828386d”
           SHA256 = “6dee4a1d4ac6b969b1f817e36cb5d36c5de84aa8fe512f3b6e7de80a2310caea”
       strings:
           $s0 = { 78 3D 55 52 4C 44 65 63 6F 64 65 72 }
           $s1 = { 53 74 72 69 6E 67 20 6F 2C 6C 2C 64 }
           $s2 = { 72 65 71 75 65 73 74 2E 67 65 74 49 6E 70 75 74 53 74 72 65 61 6D }
           $s3 = { 69 6E 64 65 78 4F 66 28 22 63 3D 22 29 }
           $s4 = { 2E 65 78 65 63 28 67 29 }
           $s5 = { 6F 75 74 2E 70 72 69 6E 74 }
           $s6 = { 70 61 72 73 65 42 61 73 65 36 34 42 69 6E 61 72 79 }
           $s7 = { 46 69 6C 65 2E 73 65 70 61 72 61 74 6F 72 }
           $s8 = { 6F 3D 22 55 70 6C 6F 61 64 65 64 }
           $s9 = { 6F 75 74 2E 70 72 69 6E 74 28 65 29 }
       condition:
           filesize < 10KB and all of them
    }
  • rule CISA_10401765_01 : webshell backdoor
    {
       meta:
           Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
           Incident = “10401765”
           Date = “2022-09-02”
           Last_Modified = “20220916_2100”
           Actor = “n/a”
           Category = “Webshell Backdoor”
           Family = “n/a”
           Description = “Detects JSP webshell samples”
           MD5_1 = “91de296c801db00a24a2832b5e12d345”
           SHA256_1 = “bc5b1f588cd506a69c03a7980a363846fa474b78e6946fa90e58d735c65f2bb6”
       strings:
           $s1 = { 70 61 67 65 20 69 6d 70 6f 72 74 3d 22 6a 61 76 61 2e 69 6f 2e 2a 2c 20 6a 61 76 61 2e 75 74 69 6c 2e 2a 2c 20 6a 61 76 61 78 2e 78 6d 6c 2e 62 69 6e 64 2e 2a 2c 20 6a 61 76 61 2e 6e 65 74 2e 2a }
           $s2 = { 65 76 61 6c 28 77 69 6e 64 6f 77 2e 6c 6f 63 61 6c 53 74 6f 72 61 67 65 2e 65 6d 62 65 64 29 }
           $s3 = { 70 3d 52 75 6e 74 69 6d 65 2e 67 65 74 52 75 6e 74 69 6d 65 28 29 2e 65 78 65 63 28 67 29 }
           $s4 = { 69 3d 6e 65 77 20 44 61 74 61 49 6e 70 75 74 53 74 72 65 61 6d 28 70 2e 67 65 74 49 6e 70 75 74 53 74 72 65 61 6d 28 29 29 }
           $s5 = { 72 3d 6e 65 77 20 44 61 74 61 49 6e 70 75 74 53 74 72 65 61 6d 28 72 65 71 75 65 73 74 2e 67 65 74 49 6e 70 75 74 53 74 72 65 61 6d 28 29 29 }
           $s6 = { 6c 3d 72 2e 72 65 61 64 4c 69 6e 65 28 29 29 21 3d 6e 75 6c 6c 29 }
           $s7 = { 62 3d 64 2e 69 6e 64 65 78 4f 66 28 22 62 3d 22 29 }
           $s8 = { 6e 3d 64 2e 69 6e 64 65 78 4f 66 28 22 6e 3d 22 29 }
           $s9 = { 6d 3d 44 61 74 61 74 79 70 65 43 6f 6e 76 65 72 74 65 72 2e 70 61 72 73 65 42 61 73 65 36 34 42 69 6e 61 72 79 }
           $s10 = { 6f 75 74 2e 70 72 69 6e 74 28 22 3c 70 72 65 3e 22 29 }
           $s11 = { 73 3d 69 2e 72 65 61 64 4c 69 6e 65 28 29 29 21 3d 6e 75 6c 6c 29 }
           $s12 = { 66 3d 76 28 64 2e 73 75 62 73 74 72 69 6e 67 28 32 2c 6e 2d 31 29 29 2b 46 69 6c 65 2e 73 65 70 61 72 61 74 6f 72 2b 76 28 64 2e 73 75 62 73 74 72 69 6e 67 28 6e 2b 32 2c 62 2d 31 29 29 }
           $s13 = { 73 74 72 65 61 6d 3d 6e 65 77 20 46 69 6c 65 4f 75 74 70 75 74 53 74 72 65 61 6d 28 }
           $s14 = { 78 3d 55 52 4c 44 65 63 6f 64 65 72 2e 64 65 63 6f 64 65 28 77 2c 22 55 54 46 2d 38 22 29 }
           $s15 = { 6f 3d 22 55 70 6c 6f 61 64 65 64 3a 20 22 2b 66 }
       condition:
           filesize < 5KB and all of them
    }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This file is a JSP webshell that also allows file upload to the victim web server. If the client request body contains “c=”, the script reads the contents of the body starting from the third character and executes it as a command in a separate process. The output from that command is sent back to the client.

If the client request body does not contain “c=” and is not an empty string, the script will attempt to write a file on the victim web server. The script assumes that the request body is in the following format and parses its contents accordingly: “{file directory} n={filename} b={data encoded in base64}”. The script decodes the base64 encoded data, and writes it to the location specified by the file directory and filename values obtained from the client request body. If the file upload was successful, confirmation is sent back to the client.

Screenshots

Figure 1 - The snippet of code that parses the client request body for the command to execute on the victim web server.

Figure 1 – The snippet of code that parses the client request body for the command to execute on the victim web server.

Figure 2 - The snippet of code that parses the contents of the client request body to upload a file onto the victim web server.

Figure 2 – The snippet of code that parses the contents of the client request body to upload a file onto the victim web server.

14bf0cbee88507fb016d01e3ced053858410c389be022d2aa4d075287c781c4a

Tags

webshell

Details
Name hiall.jsp
Size 673 bytes
Type ASCII text, with very long lines, with no line terminators
MD5 6acf93001a61f325e17a6f0f49caf5d1
SHA1 ab479f3054a3d9d596fd2c73985120e5817912f3
SHA256 14bf0cbee88507fb016d01e3ced053858410c389be022d2aa4d075287c781c4a
SHA512 bd631f24c22f18c30912f0af9cd0638d7255989c1ea08f3368039e5978633b0c70cd4de78bc81eea60c224001b371ce44c35a34a0bda5a2d4d66ed5d289e3796
ssdeep 12:6/ecRT876QQFN+d6qq0oyDhDRd6rA2TTm2Fb4PloBhXhMNj/Krxa+d0JK32Qt:CT8eH86qRoyF60v4bCloBcur076
Entropy 5.491932
Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules
  • rule CISA_10410305_01 : webshell
    {
       meta:
           Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
           Incident = “10410305”
           Date = “2022-10-24”
           Last_Modified = “20221028_1730”
           Actor = “n/a”
           Family = “n/a”
           Malware_Type = “Webshell”
           Tool_Type = “n/a”
           Capabilities = “n/a”
           Description = “Detects JSP webshells”
           MD5 = “6acf93001a61f325e17a6f0f49caf5d1”
           SHA256 = “14bf0cbee88507fb016d01e3ced053858410c389be022d2aa4d075287c781c4a”
       strings:
           $s0 = { 72 65 71 75 65 73 74 }
           $s1 = { 67 65 74 50 61 72 61 6D 65 74 65 72 }
           $s2 = { 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73 42 75 69 6C 64 65 72 }
           $s3 = { 73 65 70 61 72 61 74 6F 72 43 68 61 72 }
           $s4 = { 67 65 74 49 6E 70 75 74 53 74 72 65 61 6D }
           $s5 = { 75 73 65 44 65 6C 69 6D 69 74 65 72 }
           $s6 = { 72 65 73 70 6F 6E 73 65 }
           $s7 = { 73 65 6E 64 45 72 72 6F 72 }
           $s8 = { 39 39 }
           $s9 = { 31 30 39 }
           $s10 = { 31 30 30 }
           $s11 = { 34 37 }
           $s12 = { 36 37 }
           $s13 = { 39 38 }
           $s14 = { 31 30 35 }
           $s15 = { 31 31 30 }
           $s16 = { 39 37 }
           $s17 = { 31 31 35 }
           $s18 = { 31 30 34 }
           $s19 = { 34 35 }
       condition:
           all of them and #s8 >= 2 and #s11 >= 3 and #s13 >= 2
    }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This file is a JSP webshell. It reads the value of the parameter named “raw” in the client request, which ends up being the shell command that gets run. Based on the file separator character, the script detects whether the operating system (OS) is Windows or Linux. If the value of “raw” is not null and the OS is Windows, it starts a new process with the command “cmd /C {value of raw}”. If the value of “raw” is not null and the OS is Linux, it starts a new process with the command “/bin/bash -c {value of raw}”. Since the client sends in the value of “raw”, it controls what gets run in the shell. Lastly, the output of the command gets printed on the webpage for the client to see.

Screenshots

Figure 3 - A snippet of code that takes the data the client sent and uses ProcessBuilder to execute the data as shell commands.

Figure 3 – A snippet of code that takes the data the client sent and uses ProcessBuilder to execute the data as shell commands.

814a169ba97b168f95af3340b60a6fec1f29c87be89226b1966d9b0abfb19a15

Tags

backdoortrojanwebshell

Details
Name aes.jsp
Size 867 bytes
Type HTML document, ASCII text
MD5 5b739059ebb590df7bc7ed33c8d62531
SHA1 48e520d4705ae143783f1375e384eb793fb2b513
SHA256 814a169ba97b168f95af3340b60a6fec1f29c87be89226b1966d9b0abfb19a15
SHA512 db9bd83387037cfdc3567d8b351e85f1d135f80ee30b99cd526206d1d7cca62ac3c6868700f244debf2ba8763846d288eb3528a5b254f3861c7459cb47cf9349
ssdeep 12:e8dq1ctsjn9eARWTNEhRTCKp9n/UXRTq7NeqTq/v2aW+YDQ3qTqa:1gJj9eKWTmHTPfcTqnTqH1YDfTqa
Entropy 5.166005
Antivirus
AhnLab WebShell/JSP.Small.S1403
ESET Java/Webshell.K trojan
IKARUS Backdoor.PHP.Remoteshell
McAfee JSP/BackDoor.g
Quick Heal ASP.Webshell.45634
Sophos Troj/WebShel-BB
YARA Rules
  • rule CISA_10400779_08 : trojan webshell
    {
       meta:
           Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
           Incident = “10400779”
           Date = “2022-08-29”
           Last_Modified = “20220908_1400”
           Actor = “n/a”
           Category = “Trojan Webshell”
           Family = “n/a”
           Description = “Detects JSP Webshell command execution samples”
           MD5 = “7153cfe57d2df499175aced7e92bcf65”
           SHA256 = “ffb0f637776bc4cfcf5a24406ebf48fc21b9dcec68587a010f21b88250bda195”
       strings:
           $s0 = { 67 65 74 50 61 72 61 6D 65 74 65 72 28 22 63 6D 64 22 29 }
           $s1 = { 6F 75 74 2E 70 72 69 6E 74 6C 6E 28 22 43 6F 6D 6D 61 6E 64 }
           $s2 = { 22 3C 42 52 3E 22 }
           $s3 = { 67 65 74 50 72 6F 70 65 72 74 79 }
           $s4 = { 22 6F 73 2E 6E 61 6D 65 22 }
           $s5 = { 22 77 69 6E 64 6F 77 73 22 }
           $s6 = { 63 6D 64 2E 65 78 65 20 2F 43 }
           $s7 = { 4F 75 74 70 75 74 53 74 72 65 61 6D }
           $s8 = { 6F 75 74 2E 70 72 69 6E 74 6C 6E 28 64 69 73 72 29 }
       condition:
           all of them
    }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This file is a JSP webshell. When initially loaded, there will be a text box and a button named “Send”. The client can type anything in the text box. Clicking the “Send” button will submit the form and send the request to the web server. The string in the text box is sent over in the request parameter “cmd”. If the “cmd” parameter is not null when the web server receives the request, the script will detect the OS type. If the OS is Windows, it starts a new process with the command “cmd /C {value of cmd}”. If the OS is Linux, it starts a new process with the command “{value of cmd}”. Since the client determines the value of “cmd”, it controls what gets run in the shell. Lastly, the command that ran and the output of that command gets printed on the webpage for the client to see.

Screenshots

Figure 4 - This is what the resulting webpage looks like when the "cmd" parameter in the client request was "echo hello".

Figure 4 – This is what the resulting webpage looks like when the “cmd” parameter in the client request was “echo hello”.

Recommendations

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

  • Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
  • Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
  • Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
  • Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
  • Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
  • Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
  • Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
  • Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
  • Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
  • Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
  • Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
  • Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
  • Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.

Contact Information

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/

Document FAQ

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.

Introducing people insights (working-with) privacy controls

Introducing people insights (working-with) privacy controls

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

In May 2020, we announced plans to have more granular privacy controls within Microsoft products. This is part of Microsoft’s continued commitment to providing products, information and controls that lets you choose how your data is collected and used. After this announcement, several controls have been released. Now we would like to announce the release of peopleInsights admin controls.


 


The hundreds of millions of users of Microsoft 365 cloud services form part of the core of Microsoft Graph. The users’ data is carefully managed, protected, and with proper authorization, made available by Microsoft Graph services to drive productivity and creativity in businesses.


As ubiquitous the user’s data is in Microsoft Graph, data derived from the user’s interactions is particularly interesting. It provides intelligent insights that can be used to build smarter apps. The people API returns people ordered by relevance to a user, based on that user’s contacts, organization directory, and recent public communications on email.


 


For a person to be included as relevant to or “working with” a profile owner in Office Delve, to be displayed in the owner’s profile card, or to be returned by the people API, there must be a public relationship between the person and the profile owner. The following illustration shows a User A, an index of relationships with other users (User B), and a public profile showing a subset of user relationships.


 


BillBaer_0-1668097551160.png


 


 


We are pleased to announce new privacy controls which provide you with the ability to configure the visibility of the list of relevant people, also called Working-with or peopleInsights. The controls will give administrators the ability to disable the controls for all users by using “isEnabledInOrganization” parameter in Microsoft Graph. Alternatively, they can disable the feature on admin center by checking the “Allow your organization to use People Insights” checkbox shown below.


BillBaer_1-1668097551169.png


 


If an organization only needs to disable the feature for a group of people, they have the option of using the “disableForGroup” parameter. They will need to provide the id of an Azure AD group. The group should have all affected users. Note, only one group can be disabled. The alternative is using admin center page and adding the name of the group to be disabled for in the text field as shown above. The controls above respect the existing Office Delve settings already in place.


 


We are working on releasing user level controls as well in the future to ensure that at user level people have control over their own privacy.


 

CISA Releases SSVC Methodology to Prioritize Vulnerabilities

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

Today CISA published its guide on Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC), a vulnerability management methodology that assesses vulnerabilities and prioritizes remediation efforts based on exploitation status, impacts to safety, and prevalence of the affected product in a singular system.

As stated in Executive Assistant Director (EAD) Eric Goldstein’s blog post Transforming the Vulnerability Management Landscape, implementing a methodology, such as SSVC, is a critical step to advancing the vulnerability management ecosystem. Additionally, the blog details advances—including

CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) machine-readable security advisories, and the Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange (VEX)—that, used in conjunction with SSVC, will reduce the window cyber threat actors have to exploit networks.

CISA encourages organizations to read EAD Goldstein’s blog post and to use the following resources on the SSVC webpage to strengthen their vulnerability management processes:

  • CISA’s SSVC decision tree
  • SSVC Guide on using SSVC and the SSVC decision tree
  • SSVC Calculator for prioritizing vulnerability responses in an organization’s respective environment

Cisco Releases Security Updates for Multiple Products

This article is contributed. See the original author and article here.

Cisco has released security updates to address vulnerabilities in multiple Cisco products. A remote attacker could exploit some of these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system. For updates addressing lower severity vulnerabilities, see the Cisco Security Advisories page. 

CISA encourages users and administrators to review the following advisories and apply the necessary updates:

•    Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software and Firepower Threat Defense Software SSL/TLS Client Denial of Service Vulnerability cisco-sa-ssl-client-dos-cCrQPkA 
•    Cisco Secure Firewall 3100 Series Secure Boot Bypass Vulnerability cisco-sa-fw3100-secure-boot-5M8mUh26
•    Cisco Firepower Threat Defense Software Generic Routing Encapsulation Denial of Service Vulnerability cisco-sa-ftd-gre-dos-hmedHQPM
•    Cisco FirePOWER Software for ASA FirePOWER Module, Firepower Management Center Software, and NGIPS Software SNMP Default Credential Vulnerability cisco-sa-fmcsfr-snmp-access-6gqgtJ4S
•    Cisco Firepower Management Center and Firepower Threat Defense Software SSH Denial of Service Vulnerability cisco-sa-fmc-dos-OwEunWJN
•    Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software and Firepower Threat Defense Software SNMP Denial of Service Vulnerability cisco-sa-asaftd-snmp-dos-qsqBNM6x
•    Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software and Firepower Threat Defense Software Dynamic Access Policies Denial of Service Vulnerability cisco-sa-asa-ftd-dap-dos-GhYZBxDU