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Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). CISA processed three (3) files associated with a variant of DarkSide ransomware. NOTE: CISA has no evidence that this variant is related to the pipeline incident, referred to in Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks.

Ransomware is designed to encrypt the victim’s files to extort and ransom for their recovery. DarkSide is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS)–the developers of the ransomware received a share of the proceeds from the cybercriminal actors who deploy it, known as “affiliates.” This DarkSide ransomware variant executes a dynamic-link library (DLL) program used to delete Volume Shadow copies available on the system. The malware collects, encrypts, and send system information to the threat actor’s command and control (C2) domains and generates a ransom note to the victim.

CISA is distributing this MAR, which includes suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques, to help network defenders identify and mitigate risks.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10337802-1.v1.WHITE.stix.

Click here for a PDF version of this report.

Submitted Files (3)

156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 (156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d…)

3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a (045621d9.BMP)

f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e (README.045621d9.TXT)

Domains (2)

baroquetees.com

rumahsia.com

IPs (2)

176.103.62.217

99.83.154.118

156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673

Tags

downloaderloaderransomwaretrojan

Details
Name 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673.dll
Size 55810 bytes
Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5 f587adbd83ff3f4d2985453cd45c7ab1
SHA1 2715340f82426f840cf7e460f53a36fc3aad52aa
SHA256 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673
SHA512 37acf3c7a0b52421b4b33b14e5707497cfc52e57322ad9ffac87d0551220afc202d4c0987460d295077b9ee681fac2021bbfdebdc52c829b5f998ce7ac2d1efe
ssdeep 768:u2v9Ij6f3J8OT1PMK30DbQDH2doyomHRL83M4/NShWxEs0l29SFd2Xyj09rLd:fmET1PMK3qbpHY3M4wWmXgSFTSrLd
Entropy 6.789366
Antivirus
Ahnlab Ransomware/Win.DarkSide
Antiy Trojan[Ransom]/Win32.DarkSide.gen
Avira TR/AD.DarkSideRansom.muasl
BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.46189032
ClamAV Win.Packed.DarkSide-9262656-0
Comodo Malware
Cyren W32/Trojan.HLZV-8042
ESET a variant of Win32/Filecoder.DarkSide.B trojan
Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.46189032 (B)
Ikarus Trojan-Ransom.DarkSide
K7 Trojan ( 005795061 )
Lavasoft Trojan.GenericKD.46189032
McAfee GenericRXOX-NH!F587ADBD83FF
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.Encoder.iuukal
Quick Heal Trojanransom.Encoder
Symantec Downloader
Systweak trojan-ransom.darkside
TACHYON Ransom/W32.DarkSide.55810
TrendMicro Ransom.17F5A898
TrendMicro House Call Ransom.17F5A898
VirusBlokAda BScope.TrojanRansom.Convagent
Zillya! Trojan.Encoder.Win32.2315
YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date 2021-04-05 18:09:20-04:00
Import Hash 6c8408bb5d7d5a5b75b9314f94e68763
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
db99af79840cc24e4a2bc8920af97c4d header 1024 1.699168
6738c20d4ea897835026864651841fca .text 37376 6.090461
4e6ca671cfd10e3aa0e2dcd99bc287b6 .text1 1024 5.130274
c0265513cd36f1d659cc71bd70bfef58 .rdata 512 3.215043
3853bbcd5344aff518bb2f1ccbd05bdd .data 12288 7.713634
4d2b117a0087a34a0cb8575f34413c47 .ndata 3584 7.935769
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Borland Delphi 3.0 (???)
Relationships
156335b95b… Connected_To baroquetees.com
156335b95b… Connected_To rumahsia.com
156335b95b… Dropped 3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a
156335b95b… Dropped f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e
Description

This artifact is a 32-bit DLL that is a Darkside ransomware variant. The program is called ‘encryptor2.dll’. When it is executed, it will invoke the Volume Shadow service (vssvc.exe) to delete any Volume Shadow copies available on the system.

The malware collects information on the system to include the operating system, default language, username, hostname, domain, and operating system (OS) architecture. This information is encrypted and sent to one of the following command-and-control (C2) domains:

—Begin C2 Domains—
baroquetees[.]com
rumahsia[.]com
—End C2 Domains—

The malware reads the system GUID and uses the value to generate a unique eight character hexadecimal extension that it appends to the encrypted files. This extension is also used as the name of the running service the program uses to encrypt the user’s data.

—Begin Service Example—
HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetservices.045621d9
HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetservices.045621d9DisplayName Data: “.045621d9”
HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetservices.045621d9ObjectName Data: “LocalSystem”
HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetservices.045621d9ImagePath Data: <Path to the DLL>
—End Service Example—

This variant of the malware contains a hard-coded key ‘_M8607761bf3212d6’ that it uses to decrypt an embedded base64 encoded configuration that runs the ransomware program. The program is configured to avoid encrypting any files located in directories that contain the following strings:

—Begin Avoided Directories—
$recycle.bin
config.msi
$windows.~bt
$windows.~ws
windows
appdata
application data
boot
google
mozilla
program files
program files (x86)
programdata
system volume information
tor browser
windows.old
intel
msocache
perflogs
x64dbg
public
all users
default
—End Avoided Directories—

Any files with the following extensions will not be encrypted:

—Begin File Extensions—
.386
.adv
.ani
.bat
.bin
.cab
.cmd
.com
.cpl
.cur
.deskthemepack
.diagcab
.diagcfg
.diagpkg
.dll
.drv
.exe
.hlp
.icl
.icns
.ico
.ics
.idx
.ldf
.lnk
.mod
.mpa
.msc
.msp
.msstyles
.msu
.nls
.nomedia
.ocx
.prf
.ps1
.rom
.rtp
.scr
.shs
.spl
.sys
.theme
.themepack
.wpx
.lock
.key
.hta
.msi
.pdb
.sql
—End File Extensions—

Before the encryption routine starts, the program will check to determine if any of the following processes are running, and shut them down:

—Begin Running Processes—
oracle
ocssd
dbsnmp
synctime
agntsvc
isqlplussvc
xfssvccon
mydesktopservice
ocautoupds
encsvc
firefox
tbirdconfig
mydesktopqos
ocomm
dbeng50
sqbcoreservice
excel
infopath
msaccess
mspub
onenote
outlook
powerpnt
steam
thebat
thunderbird
visio
winword
wordpad
notepad
—End Running Processes—

The following services will also be terminated:

—Begin Terminated Services—
.vss
.sql
svc$
memtas
mepocs
sophos
veeam
backup
GxVss
GxBlr
GxFWD
GxCVD
GxCIMgr
—End Terminated Services—

After the encryption routine runs, a bitmap image file is created in the path C:ProgramData with the same name as the encryption extension, e.g. ‘045621d9.BMP’. The following registry keys are created that generate a ransom note wallpaper on the user’s desktop:

—Begin Wallpaper Registry Keys—
HKUDEFAULTControlPanelDesktopWallpaper Data: <Path to .BMP file>
HKCUControlPanelDesktopWallpaper    Data: <Path to .BMP file>
—End Wallpaper Registry Keys—

The .BMP file contains instructions to the victim for recovering data (Figure 1).

In each directory that the program has encrypted files, a ransom note is dropped with the naming format ‘README.<UniqueID>.TXT’. The file contains instructions for the victim to follow to recover files.

The following is an example of the recovery instructions:

—Begin Recovery Instructions—

———– [ Welcome to DarkSide ] ————->

What happend?
———————————————-
Your computers and servers are encrypted, backups are deleted. We use strong encryption algorithms, so you cannot decrypt your data.
But you can restore everything by purchasing a special program from us – universal decryptor. This program will restore all your network.
Follow our instructions below and you will recover all your data.

What guarantees?
———————————————-
We value our reputation. If we do not do our work and liabilities, nobody will pay us. This is not in our interests.
All our decryption software is perfectly tested and will decrypt your data. We will also provide support in case of problems.
We guarantee to decrypt one file for free. Go to the site and contact us.

How to get access on website?
———————————————-
Using a TOR browser:
1) Download and install TOR browser from this site: hxxps[:]//torproject.org/
2) Open our website: hxxp[:]//dark24zz36xm4y2phwe7yvnkkkkhxionhfrwp67awpb3r3bdcneivoqd.onion/ZWQHXVE7MW9JXE5N1EGIP6IMEFAGC7LNN6WJCBVKJFKB5QXP6LUZV654ASG7977V

When you open our website, put the following data in the input form:
Key:

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

!!! DANGER !!!
DO NOT MODIFY or try to RECOVER any files yourself. We WILL NOT be able to RESTORE them.
!!! DANGER !!!

—End Recovery Instructions—

Screenshots

Figure 1. -

Figure 1. –

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.

Brought to you by Dr. Ware, Microsoft Office 365 Silver Partner, Charleston SC.